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iii

STATUTES A N D R U L E S O F IMPORTANCE T O T H E A P P E A L

UNITED STATES C O N S T , AMEND.

XIV, C L . 1: [Citizenship Rights.]

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U T A H C O N S T , ART.

I, § 7. [Due Process of Law]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
9 U.S.C. § 2. VALIDITY, IRREVOCABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS
TOARBITRATE

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
9 U.S.C. § 3. S T A Y OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE ISSUE THEREIN REFERABLE
TO ARBITRATION

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

i
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9 U.S.C. § 4. FAILURE TO ARBITRATE UNDER AGREEMENT; PETITION T O UNITED
STATES COURT HAVING JURISDICTION FOR ORDER TO C O M P E L ARBITRATION;
NOTICE AND SERVICE THEREOF; HEARING AND DETERMINATION

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such application shall be
served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings,
under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for
an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial
be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in
dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine
such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in
default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the
notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such
demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may
specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in
writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding
thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing
the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof.
UTAH C O D E A N N .

§ 78-31a-4 (1999) COURT ORDER TO ARBITRATE

(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of

ii
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the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having
jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made
to that court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper
venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement.
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a
stay of the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for
the claim have not been shown.

SPA A G R E E M E N T ARBITRATION PROVISION

Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained
herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by the
parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator or
arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall
be resolved by the binding decision of the arbitrator
SPA Agreement, at § 5.8.1

iii
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JURISDICTION

The district court issued a Ruling and Order (re Arbitration Issues) on
Saturday, November 20, 2010, which was entered on Monday, November 22,
2010, [hereinafter "Order Denying Arbitration"]. The current provisions of the Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78B-11-129(1 )(a) and of its
predecessor, the Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78-31 a-19(1) (1999),
each provide an immediate right of appeal from an order denying a motion to
compel arbitration. The notice of appeal to this Court was filed on Monday,
November 22, 2010, shortly after the Order Denying Arbitration was entered and
within 30 days after the date of entry of such order, as required by UTAH R. A P P .
P. 4(a).
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the Order
Denying Arbitration pursuant to UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). That appeal
was assigned Appellate Case No. 20100928-SC.
Plaintiff and Appellant The D A Osguthorpe Family Partnership
("Osguthorpe") argued to the trial court that the appeal in Appellate Case No.
20100928-SC deprived it of jurisdiction to proceed further on any arbitrable
issues. The trial court disagreed and so Plaintiff and Appellant filed its second
motion to stay and compel arbitration, this time expressly grounded on the federal
arbitration act. The trial court denied that motion and an Order denying such
motion was entered on Tuesday, April 12, 2011.The current provisions of the

1
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Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78B-11-129(1 )(a) and of its
predecessor, the Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78-31 a-19(1) (1999),
each provide an immediate right of appeal from an order denying a motion to
compel arbitration, as does the federal arbitration act, 9 U.S.C. § 16. The notice
of appeal to this Court from that Order was filed one week later, on Tuesday, April
19, 2011, within 30 days after the date of entry of such order, as required by
UTAH R. A P P . P. 4(a).

This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the
second Order pursuant to UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The appeal from
that Order was assigned Appellate Case No. 20110404-SC. These two appeals
by Plaintiff and Appellant were consolidated into the first-filed appeal, Appellate
Case No. 20100928-SC, by Order of this Court dated July 12, 2011.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT COMPELLING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION A C T AND THE UTAH ARBITRATION A C T ?

i.

Standard of appellate review.

Whether the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership has the right under the
Arbitration Agreement to have the court enforce the Arbitration Agreement by
compelling ASC Utah and Wolf Mountain to arbitrate their claims under or relating
to the SPA Agreement is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, fl 7,189 P.3d 40,43.
2
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DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT STAYING THE LITIGATION PENDING
ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION A C T AND THE UTAH
ARBITRATION ACT?

ii.

Standard of appellate review.

Whether the D A Osguthorpe Family Partnership has the right under the
Federal Arbitration Act and Utah Arbitration Act to have the court stay the
litigation pending arbitration of all arbitrable issues under or relating to the SPA
Agreement is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Bybee v.
Abdulla, 2008 UT 35,U 7, 189 P.3d 40, 43.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT AFFORDING PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT DUE
PROCESS BY RULING WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING
REGARDING THE EFFECT OF ASC UTAH, INC. V. WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.,
2010 UT 65,245 P.3D 184 (2010) ON UTAH LAW?

iii.

Standard of appellate review.

"Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are
questions of law that we review for correctness." J.S v. P.K. (In re Adoption of
/./g, 2009 UT 70, U 7, 220 P.3d 464, 467.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This case concerns the contractual right of one party to a thirty-six (36)
party mandatory arbitration agreement (The D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership
[hereinafter "Osguthorpe"] (a) to compel the arbitration of arbitrable issues that
3
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are being litigated between two (2) of the other parties to the arbitration
agreement (Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. [hereinafter "Wolf Mountain"] and A S C
Utah, Inc. dba The Canyons [hereinafter "ASC"]), which two parties have waived
their own right to arbitration of the arbitrable issues and (b) to have the litigation in
which those two other parties are litigating the arbitrable issues stayed pending
the arbitration of the arbitrable issues that must be decided in arbitration.
The arbitration agreement at issue is contained within an agreement called
the "Amended and Restated Development Agreement For ASC Specially
Planned Area- Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah," ("SPA Agreement"), R.
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. As shown by its signature pages, the thirty-six
(36) parties to the SPA Agreement who have contracted for the resolution of all
disputes under the SPA Agreement by way of mandatory and binding arbitration
are: (1) Summit County; (2) ASC; (3) American Skiing Company Resort
Properties, Inc.; (4) Beaver Creek Associates; (5) Thair Schneiter; (6) Wolf
Mountain; (7) Willow Draw, L . C ; (8) Osguthorpe; (9) Oliver B. Johnston Family
Partnership; (10) William Lincoln Spoor; (11) Leslee Sherrill Spoor; (12) Iron
Mountain Associates, LLC; (13) IHC Hospitals, Inc. nka IHC Health Services, Inc.;
(14) Olympus Construction, LLC; (15) A S C Cabin Club, LLC; (16) Harold E.
Babcock; (17) Halbet Engineering, Inc.; (18) Harold R. Weight; (19) Ruth B.
Weight; (20) State of Utah School & Institutional Trust Lands; (21) Mines
Ventures Company, Inc.; (22) C & M Properties, LLC; (23) Silver King Mines; (24)

4
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Parkway Land Development, LC; (25) Parkwest Associates; (26) Sugarbowl
Associates, LLC; (27) Richard Jaffa; (28) Joseph L. Krofcheck; (29) Gerald
Friedman; (30) The Hansen Group, LC; (31) Robert M. Astle; (32) Joan E. Astle;
(33) DRM Investment Company, LC; (34) Jack Barnard; (35) Gregory A. Dean;
and (36) Ski Land, LLC. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4.
ASC argues that it is entitled to complete the litigation it started in 2006 of
arbitrable issues it raised in a dispute it has with Wolf Mountain. Wolf Mountain,
for its part, after freely litigating the arbitrable issues in ASC's dispute and its own
disputes it raised against ASC for years, moved to compel arbitration and its
motion was denied because, the trial court ruled, Wolf Mountain had waived its
own right to arbitration by litigating the arbitrable issues for years. This Court
affirmed that determination in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC,
2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010). Following the ruling about its own waiver, Wolf
Mountain proceeded with ASC, to litigate the arbitrable issues in contravention of
Osguthorpe's demand to have all the arbitrable SPA Agreement dispute issues
arbitrated.
The SPA Agreement involved the exchange and development of certain
real property in Summit County, Utah, at the base of The Canyons ski resort.
Osguthorpe had the right to receive and develop valuable commercial real
property under the SPA Agreement and Summit County granted Osguthorpe
essential entitlements for such purposes by virtue of the SPA Agreement.

5
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ASC and Wolf Mountain had each waived their individual rights to demand
arbitration and each had instead been litigating issues concerning respective
claims of delay in the development of the golf course required by the SPA
Agreement. In September, 2009, Summit County issued a notice of default to
Osguthorpe, ASC, Wolf Mountain and several other parties for non-performance
under the SPA Agreement. Summit County threatened that if such defaults were
not cured, that it would strip Osguthorpe's entitlements. The defaults alleged by
Summit County against Osguthorpe included the very disputed issued under the
SPA Agreement that had been litigated for years between Wolf Mountain and
ASC. So all of the arbitrable issues as to which only ASC and Wolf Mountain had
waived their arbitration rights and chosen to litigate as between themselves, were
now issues which affected claims of Osguthorpe arising from the Summit County
notice of default. Osguthorpe therefore had the contractual right to compel A S C
and Wolf Mountain to have all such issues decided by binding arbitration, even
the issues that two of the thirty-six parties to the SPA Agreement had chose to
litigate.
When Osguthorpe made a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the
litigation of all such arbitrable issues, the trial court, relying on the change in the
prior law of arbitration which the trial court found was a change in the landscape
in the law of arbitration, effected by ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts,
L.C., 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010), held that none of the thirty-six parties to
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the SPA Agreement, which included Osguthorpe, any longer had an enforceable
contract right of arbitration with respect to the arbitrable issues under the SPA
Agreement that had been litigated between only two parties to the SPA
Agreement.
Osguthorpe here argues that the trial court erred in determining that no
right to compel arbitration of all of the arbitrable issues litigated as between A S C
and Wolf Mountain existed any longer, not by virtue of the arbitration agreement,
itself, but instead by virtue of a change in Utah public policy. The litigation should
have been stayed and ASC and Wolf Mountain ordered to proceed to arbitration
with Osguthorpe and other parties to the SPA Agreement who shared an interest
in the arbitrable issues as the result of Summit County's declared default and
forfeiture of entitlements. Further, because it relied entirely on this Court's
Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT65, 245 P.3d
184 (2010), but denied Osguthorpe any opportunity to address that Opinion or its
affect on Osguthorpe's motion, Osguthorpe was denied due process of law.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

On June 14, 2006, ASC filed this action against Wolf Mountain (and Wolf
Mountain later counterclaimed) alleging certain breaches of contract by Wolf
Mountain, including breaches of Wolf Mountain's obligations under the SPA
Agreement, and Wolf Mountain counterclaimed, also claiming breaches of
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contract against ASC, including breaches of ASC's obligations under the SPA
Agreement.
On August 11, 2006, Osguthorpe filed its separate complaint in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 060913348, against
Wolf Mountain, alleged certain breaches of an agreement between Osguthorpe
and Wolf Mountain by which Osguthorpe allowed Wolf Mountain to have the use
of some of its real property (unrelated to the SPA Agreement). On or about
January 10, 2007, the trial court sua sponte transferred that case to the Third
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, where it was assigned Case No.
070500018.
On September 21,2007, Osguthorpe filed its separate complaint in the
Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, Case No. 070500520, against
ASC, alleged certain breaches of the Wolf Mountain agreement to which A S C
had succeeded and other agreements between Osguthorpe and ASC by which
Osguthorpe allowed ASC to have the use of some of its real property (unrelated
to the SPA Agreement).
On October 27, 2007 and December 12,2007, ASC filed two separate
motions to consolidate the Osguthorpe's two separate cases, neither of which
involved the SPA Agreement, with its case with Wolf Mountain, part of which
involved the SPA Agreement. R. 1481-1483 and R. 1547-1549. Osguthorpe
vigorously opposed consolidation but, because of Wolf Mountain's claim that the
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Osguthorpe agreements that were the subject of the litigation by Osguthorpe
against ASC (which did not involve the SPA Agreement) violated a Ground Lease
that was also being litigated in the case, the trial court ordered consolidation of
the two separate Osguthorpe cases with the ASC/Wolf Mountain case.
The district court did order, however, that Wolf Mountain and ASC were
required to make reasonable arrangements so that Osguthorpe would not be
burdened by the consolidation with respect to discovery between ASC and Wolf
Mountain not related to the separate Osguthorpe agreements with Wolf Mountain
and ASC (not the SPA Agreements). Osguthorpe never sent, received or
participated in any discovery or motion practice regarding the separate litigation
between Wolf Mountain and ASC regarding the SPA Agreement.
The Summit County notice of default, issued July 20, 2009, was issued
after the time for moving to amend pleadings in this consolidated action was
closed under the Second Amended Case Management Order, entered on
October 21, 2008, scheduling order (which cutoff date was March 16, 2009), R.
2013-2028. On August 19, 2010, however, the trial court ordered that the parties
supplement their pleadings with all claims which had arisen since the last
pleading. R. 9192-9196. To avoid claim preclusion arguments, Osguthorpe filed
such supplemental pleading as ordered by the Court, raising for the first time its
SPA Agreement claims against ASC and Wolf Mountain arising from the 2009
notice of default. Osguthorpe never had any desire to litigate such claims and,
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more importantly, having never previously been required to examine the claims
as part of drafting the supplemental pleading, never before realized that its own
claims would be prejudiced absent a stay of the litigation and order compelling
both A S C and Wolf Mountain to take all arbitrable disputes to arbitration with
Osguthorpe and any other parties affected by the Summit County notice of
default.
Osguthorpe therefore moved to stay the litigation of all arbitrable disputes
and to compel arbitration. The trial court set a hearing on that motion on
November 24, 2010. This Court issued its Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf
Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010) on Friday, November
19, 2010. The next day, Saturday, November 20, 2010, the trial court struck the
scheduled November 24 hearing and, without notice or opportunity for any
hearing with respect to Osguthorpe's position on this Court's Opinion issued the
prior day, the trial court denied Osguthorpe's motion. The following Monday,
November 22,2010 Osguthorpe filed its appeal as allowed by the Utah
Arbitration Act.
Despite the appeal, the trial court, ASC and Wolf Mountain continued to
move forward to litigate all the arbitrable issues despite the appeal which had
been filed which, Osguthorpe argued, divested the trail court of jurisdiction over
the arbitrable issues pending resolution of the appeal. Osguthorpe therefore
sought a stay or injunction pending the outcome of the appeal under Rule 8 of the
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (i.e., not under the Arbitration Act, as to which
the propriety of the denial of a stay under that Act was on appeal). This Court
issued its summary denial of a Rule 8 stay or injunction on January 20, 2011.
Osguthorpe sought relief under the federal arbitration act in federal court,
but after that court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Osguthorpe
filed a second motion to stay this action and to compel arbitration specifically
under the federal arbitration act (an act which had been touched on but which
had not been the procedural basis of relief requested in Osguthorpe's prior
motion). R. 12249-12251. To the extent that Utah public policy interfered with
Osguthorpe's right to arbitration under the federal arbitration act, Osguthorpe
argued that Utah law was pre-empted. The trial court denied that motion and
Osguthorpe again appealed.
Despite the pendency of both appeals, the trial court, Wolf Mountain and
ASC then proceeded to try all of the arbitrable issues to a jury and to obtain a jury
verdict thereon, which was entered on April 26, 2011. R. 13129-13133.
C.

Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case

1.

In or about November 1999, Osguthorpe entered into an agreement

entitled "Amended and Restated Development Agreement For ASC Specially
Planned Area- Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah," a genuine copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A [hereinafter the "SPA Agreement"].
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2.

The SPA Agreement contains a mandatory binding arbitration clause

which states broadly, in pertinent part:
Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained
herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by
the parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed up on, an arbitrator or
arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall
be resolved by the binding decision of the arbitrator....
SPA Agreement, at 60, % 5.8.1 (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Arbitration
Agreement"]. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4.
3.

The SPA Agreement governs the development of hundreds of acres

in Summit County, Utah, some of which is owned by the out-of-state parties listed
above, and includes the development of golf courses, hotels, condominiums and
other "destination accommodations" and "resort support housing," commercial
uses, and other facilities, amenities and programs. SPA Agreement, at 4-5. R.
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4.
4.

The SPA Agreement requires implementation of a transportation

plan which includes "linkages to the Salt Lake City area, including the airport, via
various forms of transit for employees and guests." SPA Agreement, at 4-5. R.
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4.
5.

The SPA Agreement requires that "[i]n addition to providing housing

opportunities for seasonal residents and guests, the RVMA [another party to
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the SPA Agreement] will construct rental housing and provide financial subsidies
that will produce housing units for employees of The Resort and a portion of The
Resort Community, as set forth elsewhere in this Amended Agreement." SPA
Agreement, at 6 (emphasis added). R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4
6.

The SPA Agreement includes within its scope "Timeshare Estate or

Fractional Ownership Interest" residences as to which "[djuring their interval use,
owners may, as prescribed in applicable Condominium Declarations, either
occupy the unit, trade the use period for use in an exchange program, or rent the
unit to the general public through the rental program operated by the rental
manager used by the owners' association." SPA Agreement, at 13. R. 12252,
Exhibit A, See Appendix 4
7.

The required construction of the golf course must be undertaken,

according to the SPA Agreement, "to satisfy the County's [i.e., Summit County,
another party to the SPA Agreement] requirement that ASC be a world class, all
season resort" SPA Agreement, at 29, fl 3.2.6 (emphasis added). R. 12252,
Exhibit A, See Appendix 4
8.
The RVMA, another party to the SPA Agreement, is required to
prepare a Resort Competitiveness Analysis at least every five years
to assess the position of The Resort and Resort Community
versus other global businesses viewed as competitors. Such
analysis will be undertaken with two markets in mind- short-term
visitors to The Resort and resort property purchasers. The purpose
of the analysis is to identify trends in the industry and anticipate
and implement, when appropriate, programs, amenities and
facilities, marketing strategies, real estate offerings, and, other
13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

measures to capitalize on such trends and attract and retain
customers. The RVMA will include the analysis in the Annual
Review in these years that the analysis is undertaken.

SPA Agreement, at 38, If 3.3.4(a)(3) (emphasis added). R. 12252, Exhibit A, See
Appendix 4
9.

The SPA Agreement requires that all notices thereunder be sent

through the United States mails, by certified mail, including to addresses in Maine
and Texas. SPA Agreement, at 65-66,If 6.4. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix
4
10.

The SPA Agreement expressly provides "that the obligations

imposed by this Amended Agreement are only such as are consistent with state
and federal law." SPA Agreement, at 69, If 6.19. The SPA Agreement
expressly recognizes that some of its provisions may be subject to invalidation if
federal law is inconsistent with the requirements of the SPA Agreement and
states that, in those circumstances, the SPA Agreement "shall be deemed
amended to the extent necessary to make it consistent with . . . federal law."
SPA Agreement, at 69,1f 6.19. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4.
11.

Following the court-ordered cut-off to amend pleadings, Summit

County, on July 29, 2009, purporting to act under the SPA Agreement, issued its
ostensible Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter "Default Notice],
declaring, inter alia, Osguthorpe, ASC, Wolf Mountain and others to have
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defaulted under the SPA Agreement. See Default Notice, at 45-46. R. 1252,
ExhibitH.
12.

The Default Notice purported to rescind all of Osguthorpe's

entitlements provided under the SPA Agreement if the default were not cured by
October 15, 2009. R. 1252, Exhibit H.
13.

Because Osguthorpe's claims under the SPA Agreement are

premised in their entirety on defaults by ASC and Wolf Mountain in their
performance under the SPA Agreement, Osguthorpe has a property right in the
Arbitration Agreement under state law, the Federal Arbitration Act exists to
enforce that property right, requiring all such disputes and issues to be resolved
only through the contractual binding and mandatory arbitration mechanism which
ASC, Wolf Mountain and other parties to the Arbitration Agreement agreed to
pursue.
14.

Osguthorpe then argued to the trial court that it no longer had

jurisdiction over any arbitrable issues because the filing of the Notice of Appeal
divested the trial court of jurisdiction under Utah law and transferred it to the Utah
Supreme Court in Case No. 20100928. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1996) (holding that trial
court has no jurisdiction to enter orders on any issues on appeal); accord
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 413 F.3d 1158,1160-62 (10th Cir.
2005)("we are persuaded by the reasoning of the latter circuits that upon the filing
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of a non-frivolous [interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration], the district court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved
on the merits.")
15.

Osguthorpe had never raised or litigated any arbitrable issue in the

action until it filed its supplemental pleading on July 19, 2010. R. 8533-8546.
Soon thereafter, based on the Arbitration Agreement Osguthorpe filed a motion to
compel arbitration on September 29, 2010. R. 9482-9484.
16.

Judge Hilder issued a Ruling and Order (re Arbitration Issues) on

November 20, 2010, which was filed on November 22, 2010, [hereinafter "Order
Denying Arbitration"]. R. 10891-10901.
17.

In the Order Denying Arbitration, Judge Hilder did not find that the

Arbitration Agreement was not valid or was not binding on Osguthorpe, ASC,
Wolf Mountain or any other party thereto. See R. R. 10891-10901, passim.
Judge Hilder did not find that the SPA Agreement disputes were not arbitrable
issues that were the subject of the Arbitration Agreement. See R.10891-10901,
passim. Judge Hilder further did not find any waiver by Osguthorpe of its
contractual right under the Arbitration Agreement to have all arbitrable issues
decided by way of arbitration. See R. R.10891-10901, passim.
D.

Summary of the Argument

The SPA Agreement contains a mandatory and binding arbitration
provision. ASC and Wolf Mountain each waived that provision and litigated for
16
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years SPA Agreement disputes. Osguthorpe has claims under the SPA
Agreement by virtue of ostensibly being placed in default by another of the
thirty-six parties to the SPA Agreement, Summit County. Osguthorpe's claims
include disputing the default but also seeking damages against Wolf Mountain
and ASC for their own defaults thereunder, which were the cause of
Osguthorpe's ostensible default.
Osguthorpe has the contractual right to compel Wolf Mountain and ASC to
resolve all such SPA Agreement issues in arbitration and, under the Utah
Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act to have the Court enter an order
compelling both of them to arbitrate all SPA Agreement disputes. Because the
trial court proceeded to a jury verdict and judgment despite the pendency of
Osguthorpe's appeal, part of the relief to which Osguthorpe is entitled is an Order
from this Court vacating the jury verdict and judgment on the SPA Agreement
issues and to Order that the issues be sent to arbitration.
Also, the trial court denied Osguthorpe's right of due process by entering a
ruling based on this Court's Opinion in ASC v. Wolf Mountain, issued the day
previous to the trial court's ruling, and relying on that Opinion without notice to
Osguthorpe or providing Osguthorpe with any meaningful opportunity to be heard
as to the effect, if any, of that ruling on the existing law. The due process violation
also requires vacation of the jury verdict and judgment.
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ARGUMENT
I.

T H E PUBLIC POLICY DETERMINATION OF T H E UTAH LEGISLATURE AND T H E
CONGRESS OF T H E UNITED STATES TO E N F O R C E VALID ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IS PARAMOUNT AND M A Y N O T B E SUBORDINATED TO A N Y
OTHER PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

The Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E A N N . §§ 78-31 a-1 to -20 (1999)
("UAA")1 and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 ("FAA") represent the
binding legislative policy determinations of the Utah Legislature and the United
States Congress concerning the paramount public policy of enforcing mandatory
and binding arbitration agreements. In his concurring opinion in Latter v. Holsum
Bread Co., 108 Utah 364,160 P.2d 421 (1945), Mr. Justice Wolfe accurately
described the common law's judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, see
generally id. at 424-27.
Indeed, some twenty years earlier, "the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.
S. C. §1 et seq., [was] enacted in 1925 as a response to judicial hostility to
arbitration." CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10-948, 2012 U.S. LEXIS
575,

U.S.

(January 10,2012). It is fair to assume, therefore, especially

when account is taken of the limited role of the Court under the UAA, that the
Utah Arbitration Act was enacted as a public policy response by the Utah
Legislature to the same concerns about judicial hostility towards arbitration.

1

Osguthorpe cites to the prior version of the Utah Arbitration Act because it was
the version in effect at the time the SPA Agreement was entered into.
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The trial court here interpreted this Court's Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v.
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010) ("ASC v. Wolf)
as subordinating the public policy of requiring courts to enforce valid arbitration
agreements to the public policy of using arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive
method of resolving disputes. ASC and Wolf Mountain, only two out of thirty-six
parties to the SPA Agreement, decided to waive their arbitration rights, invoke the
resources of the judicial system and litigate issues that were arbitrable under the
SPA Agreement, for years.
To the extent that the trial court felt that this Court's decision in ASC v. Wolf
subordinated the legislatively-determined public policy of requiring courts to
enforce valid agreements to arbitrate to the salutary, but secondary, public policy
of the speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes, Osguthorpe believes that
the trial court misread ASC v. Wolf. If, however, this Court did so hold, then its
holding would conflict with, and is pre-empted by, the FAA.
The United States Supreme Court was presented with just such a conflict
between those two public policies in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1985). The Court had no problem
deciding that the incidental salutary benefit serving the public policy of speedy
and inexpensive conflict resolution could not stand in the face of Congress'
express public policy determination that courts must enforce valid mandatory
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arbitration agreements, regardless of the waste, inefficiency and cost that might
result:
We conclude, however, on consideration of Congress' intent in
passing the statute, that a court must compel arbitration of otherwise
arbitrable claims, when a motion to compel arbitration is made. The
legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose
behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the
suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration A ct was to
promote the expeditious resolution of claims
This is not to
say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation
for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it, the House Report
expressly observed:
"It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at
this time when there is so much agitation against the
costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be
largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration
agreements are made valid and enforceable." Id., at 2.
Nonetheless, passage of the Act was motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into
which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this
principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the
fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to
overshadow the underlying motivation. Indeed, this conclusion is
compelled by the Court's recent holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), in which
we affirmed an order requiring enforcement of an arbitration
agreement, even though the arbitration would result in bifurcated
proceedings. That misfortune, we noted, "occurs because the
relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary
to give effect to an arbitration agreement," id., at 20. See also id., at
24-25 ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration").
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the
conflict between two goals of the Arbitration Act - enforcement of
private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dispute resolution - must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to
realize the intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements
into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that
we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result
is "piecemeal" litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy
manifested in another federal statute. [Citation omitted.] By
compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court
successfully protects the contractual rights of the parties and
their rights under the Arbitration Act.
Id. at 219-21 (emphasis added).
The circumstances of the SPA Agreement are that there are thirty-six
parties who have agreed to resolve "every such continuing dispute,
difference, and disagreement' arising under the SPA Agreement through
arbitration. SPA Agreement, at 60, If 5.8.1 (emphasis added). The fact that two
of those thirty-six chose to grind through years of litigation and public resources
does not, as the trial court held, stand in the way of any other of the thirty-four
parties receiving the legislatively mandated judicial enforcement mechanisms to
protect their own right to have the identical issues resolved not between two
parties in a courtroom, but before an arbitrator. That is the right Osguthorpe
sought to have enforced by the trial court and now respectfully asks this Court to
enforce. The trial court's failure to do so and instead to allow proceedings to
move forward to verdict and judgment was error and must be reversed.
II.

IF UTAH LAW DID IN FACT SUBORDINATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ENFORCING
VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF SPEEDY AND
INEXPENSIVE RESOLUTIONS, THEN IT IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE FAA.
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The United States Supreme Court has closed the door on the question of
whether any state law in conflict with the FAA can survive- the answer is a
resounding no- all such state law is pre-empted by 9 U.S.C. § 2. See Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,10-17, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1984)(explaining pre-emption of conflicting state law by the FAA). The Court
rejected the contention that state public policy could form any basis for not
enforcing arbitration agreements. Id. at 16.
III.

BOTH THE UAA AND FAA REQUIRE ARBITRATION OF A L L SPA AGREEMENT
ISSUES CONCERNING DISPUTES BETWEEN ASC AND WOLF MOUNTAIN- THEY
AFFECT OSGUTHORPE'S SPA AGREEMENT DISPUTE.

The arbitration clause at issue herein provides:
Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism
contained herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this
Amended Agreement, then every such continuing dispute,
difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single
arbitrator agreed upon by the parties, or if no single arbitrator can
be agreed upon, an arbitrator or arbitrators shall be selected in
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association
and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be resolved by
the binding decision of the arbitrator....
SPA Agreement, at § 5.8.1 (emphasis added). In ruling on Wolf Mountain's
Motion to Amend, regarding the alleged violations of the SPA Agreement by third
parties, the trial court stated that "the SPA Agreement does require arbitration."
April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order, at 18. R. 3082. The Court added: "Thus, any
claim by Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some way is subject to the
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." R. 3098.
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Once it is established that an agreement to arbitrate exists, which is
undisputed here a presumption in favor of arbitration exists. Bybee v. Abdulla,
2008 UT 35, TI27,189 P.3d 40, 47. Likewise, it is required that the arbitration
clause be construed liberally in favor of arbitration. McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, U 15, 20 P.3d 901, 904. Arbitration
7s a remedy freely bargained for by the parties, and provides a means
of giving effect to the intention of the parties
If an arbitrable issue
exists, the parties should not be deprived of the benefits of the
agreement for which they bargained.
Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, (Utah 1981) (emphasis
added). "Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the settlement of disputes[.]"
Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2009 UT 54, % 13, 217 P.3d
716, 720. "When the parties to a dispute have contracted to settle their dispute in
arbitration, the role of the courts is extremely limited." Id., % 8, 217 P.3d at 719.
"It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of
arbitration, keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of
disputes when the parties have not agreed to litigation." fieecf v. Davis County
Sch. Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Arbitration is a matter of contract law[.j" Ellsworth v. American
Arbitration Association, 2006 UT 77, U 14,148 P.3d 983, 987. Both ASC Utah
and Wolf Mountain agreed with the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership that
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"every such continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement" which was not
sufficiently resolved by the "default mechanism" in the SPA agreement.
The default mechanism was invoked by Summit County in 2009 and that
default mechanism did not resolve the defaults of ASC Utah or Wolf Mountain or
Osguthorpe's dispute over whether its entitlements should have been stripped or
whether the breaches by ASC and Wolf Mountain were the cause of such
entitlements being stripped. The jury verdict form, itself, established beyond any
question that the SPA Agreement issues were actually litigated after
Osguthorpe's motion was denied, because special findings were entered on the
questions of whether both ASC and Wolf Mountain breached the SPA
Agreement. R. 13129-13133. Those are arbitrable issues, the resolution of which
could establish liability to Osguthorpe by both ASC and Wolf Mountain if the
arbitrator decides that they both caused delays in Osguthorpe's performance
under the SPA Agreement through their own delays.
Once a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement is determined to exist
under the SPA Agreement all the SPA Agreement issues that could relate to the
Osguthorpe claims against ASC, Wolf Mountain and other parties to the SPA
Agreement are arbitrable, the trial court had no discretion and it was required to
compel arbitration of all claims and issues relating to the SPA. McCoy v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31 fl ("Where the evidence relating to a
purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has no discretion
24
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under the statute. It must compel arbitration."). Under current Utah law, upon
ordering arbitration, the Court "on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding
that involves a claim subject to the arbitration."

UTAH C O D E A N N .

§ 78B-11-

108(7). Under the 1999 Act, "[a]n order to submit an agreement to arbitration
stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the
agreement." UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78-31a-4(3) (1999).
Federal law is the same. FAA § 3 requires that "upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration" the Court
"shall... stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." Id. It is clear that if any issue
is referable to arbitration then a stay must be entered as to every issue related in
any way to the arbitration. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Infinity Financial
Group, LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1330,1332 (S.D. Fla. 1999)("For arbitrable issues,
the language of [9 U.S.C. § 3] indicates that the stay is mandatory.")(quoting Klay
v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191,1203-04 (11th Cir. 2004)).
The United States Supreme Court explained that "the [Federal Arbitration
Act] not only 'declared a national policy favoring arbitration' but actually
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.'"
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,10, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984)
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(emphasis added). The Court further held that the FAA "created a body of
federal substantive law," which was "applicable in state and federal courts." Id.
(emphasis added). "Congress has . . . mandated the enforcement of arbitration
agreements." Id., 465 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly
announced the only two limitations on that Congressional mandate:
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration
provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part
of a written maritime contract or a contract "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce" and such clauses may be revoked upon
"grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad
principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under
state law.
Id. at 10-11. Further, the Federal Arbitration Act applies to proceedings in the
state courts and "[ujnder the FAA, state courts as well as federal courts are
obliged to honor and enforce agreements to arbitrate." Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262,173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009)(citing Southland, at 12)
(emphasis added).
The Court was clear in explaining Congress' intent in reaching that
determination. Parties who enter into arbitration agreements are free to negotiate
the terms of the agreements, and enter such agreements voluntarily. The Court
stated:
But it does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set
forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite
inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that
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private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to
their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just
as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 105 S.
Ct. 3346 (1985), so too may they specify by contract the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57,115 S. Ct. 1212,
131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995). All of the parties to the SPA Agreement, including both
ASC and Wolf Mountain, agreed to resolve "every such continuing dispute,
difference, and disagreement' arising under the SPA Agreement through
arbitration. SPA Agreement, at 60,1f 5.8.1.
It is well-settled that under the FAA, all doubts as to arbitrability must be
resolved in favor of arbitrability. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87.L.Ed. 2d 444
(1985). A strong presumption exists in determining the scope of arbitration
provisions in favor of arbitrability:
If a contract has a broad, sweeping arbitration clause, it is presumed
that disputes will be arbitrated. [ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre,
45 F.3d 1455,1462 (10th Cir. 1995)]. A party may overcome this
presumption "only if'it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute.'" Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 89 L Ed. 2d
648 (1986)). We resolve any doubts in favor of arbitrability. Litton
Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 115
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L. Ed. 2d 177 (1991); Hollern, 458 F.3d at 1173 ("In assessing the
scope of the arbitrators' authority, we are mindful of the strong
presumption requiring all doubts concerning whether a matter is
within the arbitrators' powers to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.")
Hicks v. CadleCo., Nos. 08-1306, 1307,1429 & 1435, 355 Fed. Appx. 186, 192,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26523, at **13-14 (10th Cir. December 7, 2009)
(unpublished decision).
The United States Supreme Court has explained the significant distinction
between the question of who should arbitrate arbitrability and the question of
whether the dispute is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement in First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L
Ed. 2d 985 (1995). The Court explained:
This Court, however, has (as we just said) added an important
qualification, applicable when courts decide whether a party
has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability: Courts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is "clea[rj and unmistakabl[e]"
evidence that they did so. AT&T Technologies, supra, at 649;
see Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 583, n.7. In this manner the law
treats silence or ambiguity about the question "who (primarily)
should decide arbitrability" differently from the way it treats
silence or ambiguity about the question "whether a particular
merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the
scope of a valid arbitration agreement" -- for in respect to
this latter question the law reverses the presumption.
Id. at 944-45 (emphasis added). In the case at hand, "who" should decide
arbitrability is not in issue- the court. The question of whether an issue falls
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within the scope of the arbitration clause falls squarely into the presumption of
arbitrability.
And as to that presumption, it is also clear that "'"procedural" questions
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide." Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84,123 S. Ct. 588,154 L Ed. 2d 491 (2002)
(quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557,11 L. Ed. 2d
898, 84 S. Ct. 909 (1964)). In this circumstance, those "procedural" questions
include all questions pertaining to the validity or invalidity of Summit County's
issuance its Default Notice, which questions are answered in part by the
determination of the exact issues this court is about to try to a jury. Arbitration
clauses must be construed broadly and all doubts about arbitrability must be
resolved in favor of arbitration. See National American Insurance Co. v. SCOR
Reinsurance Co., 362 F.3d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004). The role of the court is
limited:
This section [9 U.S.C. § 2] announces "a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002)
(quotations omitted). Accordingly, "arbitration is a matter of contract"
in which courts have a limited role. Id. In that limited role, courts do
not have authority to decide questions explicitly addressed by the
arbitration agreement. Id. Rather, courts are bound by the terms of
the agreement and may only decide questions of arbitrability- that is,
whether the parties have agreed to submit a specific dispute to
arbitration- "in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting
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parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the
gateway matter." Id.
Shell Oil Co. v. Co2Comm., Inc., 589 F.3d 1105,1108 (10th Cir. 2009). Upon
finding a valid arbitration agreement, the court has no discretion but to compel
arbitration and issue a stay:
The FAA provides that contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The purpose of the Act is "to place an
arbitration agreement upon the same footing as other contracts and
to overturn the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate." Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 114
F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
FAA is a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d
765(1983).
Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2010).
ASC argued below that certain conditions precedent to the right to initiate
arbitration have not yet occurred and so the motion to compel arbitration should
have been denied. It is wrong. It is entirely for the arbitrators to determine
questions about issues of procedural, as opposed to substantive, arbitrability,
such as conditions precedent. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 85, 123 S. Ct. 588,154 L Ed. 2d 491 (2002) (holding that "in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, issues of substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court
to decide and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites such as
time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an
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obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide" (quoting
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA) § 6© cmt. 2) (emphasis
added & in original)).
Summit County purported to place Osguthorpe in default. Regardless of
whether ASC, which was also placed in default, later became, as it alleged,
undefaulted (another issue for the arbitrators), Osguthorpe has ostensibly been
stripped by the County of all of its entitlements and is entitled to have all issues
related to breaches that may have led to Summit County's action under the SPA
Agreement sent to arbitration.
IV.

OSGUTHORPE W A S DENIED D U E P R O C E S S .

A hearing had been set on Osguthorpe's motion to compel arbitration and
to stay proceedings. That motion was stricken after the trial court, on the
Saturday following this Court's Friday issuance of its Opinion in ASC v. Wolf
Mountain, sua sponte ruled on Osguthorpe's motion. Under the due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution,
Osguthorpe is entitled to receive due process of law.
"The Utah Constitution, like the federal constitution, prohibits the state from
depriving any person of "life, liberty or property, without due process of law." We
have previously explained that "[t]he bare essentials of due process . . . mandate
adequate notice to those with an interest in [a proceeding] and an opportunity for
them to be heard in a meaningful manner." Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v.
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Atherton, 2011 UT 58, H10 (quoting Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, U 28, 156 P.3d 782). Where due process has not
been provided by the trial court, the judgment (and here, verdict) must be vacated
and the case remanded. See/'d., at U 17.
Here, the trial court based its ruling entirely on what it characterized as the
"sea change" in Utah law created by this Court's Opinion issued the day before.
This ruling stated: "Osguthorpes' essential argument is that 'this Court has no
discretion and must compel arbitration of all claims and issues relating to the
S P A . ' . . . The argument is supported by case law, and had some force, until
yesterday. The discussion above shows how the landscape has changed." R.
10898. This ruling. Based on the prior day's Opinion from this Court, was entered
without any notice to Osguthorpe or any meaningful opportunity for Osguthorpe to
argue whether and to what extent the landscape had changed, if at all.
Osguthorpe therefore received no due process and it respectfully asks that the
entire jury verdict and judgment be set aside and the case remanded.
V.

T H E VERDICT AND J U D G M E N T MUST B E V A C A T E D , T H E S P A A G R E E M E N T
ISSUES C O M P E L L E D TO ARBITRATION AND T H E ACTION S T A Y E D PENDING
ARBITRATION.

The vacating of improperly entered judgments occurs routinely as cases
are sent back for new trials. The remedy for the error in failing to compel
arbitration and to stay litigation is no different. The jury's verdict must be vacated,
the judgment set aside and the all SPA Agreement issues sent to arbitration. This
32
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Court has previously employed such a remedy with respect to a case that had
been litigated to judgment in the district court before another party to the
arbitration agreement demanded arbitration. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54,
982 P.2d 572, Dr. Pledger had provided services to his patient, Mrs. Gillespie. Id
at 574, If 2. Mrs. Gillespie's husband was a participant under his employer's
qualified health insurance plan, provided by Cigna Healthplan, and so his wife,
Mrs. Gillespie, was covered by the plan. Id. Mrs. Gillespie did not pay Dr.
Pledger because she believed the bill would be paid for by Cigna Healthplan. Id.,
f 3. Dr. Pledger moved for summary judgment, which was granted before Cigna
Healthplan could be served with a third-party complaint. Id.,fflj6-7. Once Cigna
Healthplan was served, it investigated the claim and engaged in contractuallyrequired efforts to resolve the dispute without litigation, for a period of two years,
/cf. at 574-75, ITIf 8-10.
After determining that the dispute could not be resolved, Cigna Healthplan
moved the district court to set aside or stay the judgment against Mrs. Gillespie
and to compel the entire dispute to arbitration. Id. The district court refused. Id.
Cigna Healthplan appealed and the Utah Supreme Court held that, since Cigna
Healthplan had not waived its own right to arbitration, the already fully-litigated
judgment obtained by Dr. Pledger against Mrs. Gillespie must be set aside and
the entire dispute ordered to arbitration. Id. at 578, U 24.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Osguthorpe respectfully requests that the Jury's
verdict on all issues relating to the SPA Agreement and the judgment entered
thereon be completely vacated and all SPA Agreement-related issues be ordered
to arbitration and the action stayed pending the conclusion of such arbitration.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of January, 2012.

-PETERS ISCOFIELD

A Rrofessionalyorpo\ati\

DAVip,W. SCOFIELC
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DJ4$gE$£ft|CT COURT -SUMMIT
IN A N D FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH

SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT

2010 NOV 22 AH !D" 52
FILED BY.

:£&.

RULING AND ORDER
(ARBITRATION ISSUES)

ASC UTAH, INC., a H a i n e
corporation, dba THE CANYONS,
Plaintiff,

Consolidated
Case N o . 060500297

vs.
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L . C , k
Utah limited liability company,

Defendant.

Judge Robert K. Hilder

WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.

'
I

Plaintiff,
vs.

I

ASC UTAH,, etc., et

Case N o . 060500404

al.,

Defendants.

STEPHEN A. OSGUSTHORPE, etc., et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 070500018
(Transferred from Salt Lake
Dept., # 060913348)

WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L . C ,
Defendant.
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.,
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Intervener.

STEPHEN A. OSGOTHORPE, etc., et al.f
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 0705D0520
ASC UTAH, INC.; AMERICAN SKIING
COMPANY; and LESLIE B > OTTENS,
Defendants.

.

Wolf Mountain (uWolf") filed its third Motion to Compel
Arbitration in August, 2010. The Osguthorpes, plaintiffs in Case No.
070500520, filed their first Motion to Compel Arbitration in
September, 20.10. Both Motions are premised on the arbitration
provision contained in the 1999 SPA Agreement. The Motions have been
fully briefed and ready for decision for some time, but for reasons
that need not be recited, scheduled hearings were continued, and on
November 3, 2010, Judge Kelly entered his recusal Order in response to
Wolf's Rule 63(b), URCP, Motion to Disqualify. I assumed
responsibility for the case on November 10, 2010.
* On November 16, 2010 the court met with counsel to plan the
future course of this case. On that day the court scheduled oral
argument on both Motions to Compel Arbitration on Wednesday November
24, 2010- Since November 16; however, two things have occurred that
eliminate the need for a hearing on the arbitration motions: The court
has read all of the briefing related to both motions, and on November
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19, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court issued its full decision affirming .
Judge Lubeck's (a predecessor judge on this case) decision denying
Wolf's earlier motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court had
issued a summary affirmance on July 22, 2010, but until yesterday, the
bases for that affirmance had not been stated.
As the court and counsel discussed on November 16, there are many
motions awaiting decision in this case, some of which have been
pending for many months, and not all of those motions necessarily
require argument. Certainly, Rule 7, URCP, which governs motion
practice, does not require argument for these non-dispositive
arbitration motions. Rule 7(e). Even in the case of dispositive
motions, the court may refuse argument if it finds that "the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been
authoritatively decided." Id.
When the court scheduled argument, it had not read the filings,
and of course it had not seen the Supreme Court decision. Now having
had the opportunity to do both, the court finds that the arbitration
issue in this case has been as authoritatively decided as one could
imagine, and both Motions must therefore be DENIED, albeit for some
different reasons. Accordingly, the scheduled hearing on arbitration
motions is hereby STRICKEN, but counsel are advised that the hearing
on the Motion to Change Venue will proceed as scheduled. The court
addresses each Motion in turn:

3
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WOLF MOUNTAIN MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
The bases for Wolf's Motion can be summarized as follows:
. 1. An agreement to arbitrate is contained in the SPA Agreement.
2. Arbitration is mandatory if an enforceable agreement exists.
3. Arbitration is favored as the public policy of this state, and
by compelling arbitration judicial resources will be conserved.
Addressing each in order, the court certainly agrees, as did
Judge Lubeck, that the SPA Agreement contains an arbitration
provision-and it has done so since 1999. That is, it is not recent
news to any party to these actions, notwithstanding that Wolf has
argued that it was not aware of its right to arbitrate until Judge
Lubeck issued his April 29, 2009, order. The Supreme Court has now
specifically considered, and rejected, that argument. ASC Utah, Inc.
V. Wolf Mountain resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, Hf 26-28 (November 19,
2010).
Second, a waiver exception to the mandatory character of
arbitration agreements has existed since at least Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992), and now in
ASC Utah the Supreme Court has removed any doubt whether the
arbitration statute prevents courts from refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements: The arbitration statute that controls this
case, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4, is neither mandatory nor
jurisdictional. 2010 UT 65 at ^ 13-21.
Much is written in memoranda supporting motions to compel
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arbitration-not just in this case, but commonly in this court's
experience-about the salutary purposes and features of. arbitration
(the "just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes")that
require enforcement of such agreements. Those benefits may indeed be
present when arbitration agreements are bargained for, and the parties
promptly exfcrcise their rights to arbitrate, but the Supreme Court has
now squarely faced the circumstances where arbitration clauses are
used in a way that, in fact, defeats the positive features that may
otherwise exist:
The legislature enacted the Act in accordance with a public
policy that favors arbitration as contractual agreements between
parties not to litigate, [citation omitted] only insofar as they
serve as "speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating
disputes, [citation omitted] and help reduce strain on judicial
resources, [citation omitted] . There is no public -policy
supporting arbitration when it would undermine these goals.
Id. at H 18 (emphasis added) .
This court could take time and pages explaining why this case may
be a prime example of misuse of the existence of an arbitration
provision/ but in fact the Supreme Court engages in that exercise,
specifically addressing this case, and repetition avails little.
Third, this court touches on the conservation of judicial
resources issue, because Wolf has chosen to include this possibility
as a basis for enforcing arbitration, albeit in a one line
declaration, without explanation or factual support: wThe arbitration
will conserve judicial resources and be less expensive for the
parties." (Wolf memorandum in support at 3 ) .
5
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How? As this court has recently commented to counsel, this case
(or more correctly, these cases) have proven to be one of the greatest
consumers of the resources of the Third District Court in many years.
The litigation has consumed years of intensive court involvement,
voluminous motion practice, extensive discovery, and even substantial
physical resources as basic as paper, copy toner, and storage space.
This consolidated case comprises more file volumes than any presently
pending case in this District that serves more than one million
citizens of this state. It is also now on its third judge and fourth
or fifth law clerk. It is maybe five or six weeks from a five week
trial-it is certainly very close to a long trial, whenever it may
actually commence-but the point is that court resources have already
been consumed almost to exhaustion. This court cannot see how the
jettisoning of much or all of that work and expense (Wolf says that:
v

The arbitration herein will likely resolve all of the disputes

presently found in this case") will somehow conserve resources. What
such a course will do, at best, is waste resources, burden parties
with further enormous costs, and delay resolution-all counter to the
policies underlying the arbitration model.
The conclusive point i3 that the Supreme Court has found (1)
arbitration is not mandatory, and (2) this case presents a clear case
of waiver on the part of Wolf. That is now the law of this case, and
the mandate from the appellate court. This court could not decide
otherwise if it wished, but certainly no reason has been advanced why
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there should be any other outcome.
Again, this court cannot state the bases for finding waiver by
Wolf, and prejudice to ASCU, better than the Supreme Court has already
done. See, 2010 UT 65 at Hf 29-36.
Wolf may argue that the court has not considered its position
that it now seeks arbitration of new claims, as asserted by ASCU by
leave of court, pursuant to Rule 15(d), URCP. The court, however,
agrees with ASCU that the claims not new, but supplements, addressing
new alleged actions since the original pleadings were closed. Even if
that is not so, the door to arbitration in this case has been slammed
shut because of the conduct of the parties, through their intensive
engagement in the litigation process, and the resulting irreparable
harm to any objective at this date, sincere or not, to engage in
arbitration to reap the benefits that may have been available through
that process years ago when all started down this litigation path.
This court sums up with words from Chief Justice Durham's
conclusion:
Utah public policy favors arbitration agreements only
insofar as they provide a speedy and inexpensive means ofadjudicating disputes, and reduce strain on judicial resources.
In this case, enforcing the arbitration agreement would undercut
both policy rationales: arbitration at this point would be
neither a" speedy and inexpensive way to adjudicate this dispute,
nor a means of reducing strain on judicial resources.
2010 UT 65 at t 40.
For all of the reasons stated herein, and even more to the point,
stated in the Utah Supreme Court's decision issued yesterday, Wolf

7
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Mountain's third Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby DENIED.
OSGUTHORPES' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
The Osguthorpe plaintiff are situated differently from Wolf for
several reasons, but not so differently that they can compel
arbitration of any claims or defenses in this consolidated action.
Even if Osguthorpes have newly asserted claims or defenses for which
they may not be fairly said to have waived any right, to arbitrate, a
point this court does not decide in the context of the present motion,
the policies underlying arbitration have been so violated in this case
that arbitration is not an option open to any party. The Supreme Court
has so decided, and even if this court did not agree (which, of
course, it adamantly does), the mandate rule leaves no room for a
different result. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc.,
196 P.3d 588(Utah 2008).
Osguthorpes' essential argument is that "this Court has no
discretion and must compel arbitration of all claims and issues
relating to the SPA." (Memorandum in support at 6) . The argument is
supported by case law, and had ,some force, until yesterday. The
discussion above shows how the landscape has changed. This court must
DENY Osguthorpes' Motion to Compel Arbitration, but it does so fully
recognizing that Osguthorpes have an option not available to Wolf
Mountain.
That is> Osguthorpes' Motion was prompted by the court's ruling
re-opening the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(d), URCP. Osguthorpes'
8
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felt compelled to assert claims at that time, whether they wanted to
or not, at the peril of losing any right to assert such claims xin the
future. During his last hearing in this case, on October 27, 2010,
Judge Kelly apparently recognized that Osguthorpes' supplemental
pleadings had created some unforeseen consequences, and on his own
motion, he first bifurcated, then dismissed those pleadings, without
prejudice to re-filing. No order to that effect has been entered, and
Judge Kelly left the door open for objections to his oral order,
This court now vacates Judge Kelly's oral ruling regarding
Osguthorpes' supplemental claims, and grants the Osguthorpe plaintiff
leave, at their option, to continue with the claims in this case, or
dismiss the claims (or any of them) without prejudice to re-filing
within a reasonable time after this case is adjudicated through a
final and appealable judgment, within any applicable statute of
limitations, or no later than six months after final judgment,
whichever occurs last. This ruling does not preclude any statute of
limitations defense available to any party if the statute has run
before the claims were filed in this case. Osguthorpes are granted
twenty days from today to make their election as provided herein.
The foregoing ruling does not include a determination that
Osguthorpes' will have an arbitration option in any future filing.1
1

This court does reject Osguthorpes' insistence that their right to arbitrate any SPA
Agreement claims was determined by Judge Lubeck and presumably affirmed by the Supreme
Court. First, all Judge Lubeck's language did was agree that the SPA Agreement includes an
arbitration provision, which it does. He then went on tofindthat provision was waived by Wolf
9
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^

That issue is reserved for future determination by the assigned court.
What this court states without question is that any claims the
Osguthorpes maintain in these consolidated cases will be litigated,
not arbitrated, for all of the reasons set forth herein and in the
Utah Supreme Court decision at 2010 UT 65.
As to the matters decided herein, this Ruling is the Order of the
court and no further Order is required.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2010.
By the Court:

Robert K. Hilder
^** /^..r.^.*i?a? r^ ..
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Mountain, which ruling has been affirmed by the court of last resort. Second, in a later order,
Judge Lubeck stated that: "This court did not rule... that Wolf [Mountain] MUST or COULD
or SHOULD arbitrate
" This language is taken as quoted in the Supreme Court decision at fl
9. Accordingly, the mandate rule has no application on this point.
10
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Him mmm OOURT
Tb'vi Judicial District

APR 12 2011
SALI UKfc COUNTV

ay.
Deputy Clerk

IN T H E DISTRICT COURT O F T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN A N D FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, S T A T E O F UTAH

A. OSGUTHORPE, individually
and in his capacity as Interim
Personal Representative of the Estate
of D A Osguthorpe, D.V.S. and also
in his capacity as Successor Trustee
of The Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust;
STEPHEN

and D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION A C T FOR ORDER
COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND FOR
IMMEDIATE STAY AND DISMISSING

Plaintiffs,

CLAIMED ARBITRABLE ISSUES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

-vsASC UTAH, INC.; AMERICAN SKIING
COMPANY; LESLIE B. OTTEN; W O L F
MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.; AND JOHN
DOES I THROUGH XX,

Defendants.

Consolidated Case No. 060500297
(Original Case No. 070500520 CN)
Honorable Robert K. Hilder

The Court, having fully considered Plaintiff D. A. Osguthorpe Family
Partnership's Motion Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act for Order Compelling
Arbitration and for Immediate Stay, being now fully advised in the premises, and good
cause appearing for all the reasons stated on the record during the hearing on Monday,
March 6,2011, by and through its undersigned counsel,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership's Motion
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act for Order Compelling Arbitration and for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Immediate Stay be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Furthermore, for the reasons
stated on the record during the hearing, any claim of the Osguthorpes that in any way
relates to an alleged breach of the SPA Agreement is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2011.

2
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IQBllVt H\
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIfj it, IWSTSlETO
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE Q JTAH
ASC UTAH, INC.; a Maine
corporation, d/b/a THE CANYONS
Plaintiff,

RULING and ORDER
Consolidated Case
No. 060500297

vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company
DATE: April 29, 2008
Defendant.
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 060500404

ASC UTAH, INC., et .al.,
Defendants.

STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 070500018
(Transferred from Salt
Lake Dept. #060913348)

vs.
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.
Defendant. •
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of ENOCH SMITH, JR.,
Intervenor.
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STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE, et al.,

• Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 070500520

ASC UTAH-, INC., -et al., •

Defendants.

The above matter came before the court on April 24, 2009 for
oral argument on ASCU's motion to strike Wolf Mountain's third
party complaint and unrelated cross claims in case no. 070500520
and third parties' motion to dismiss and defendant's motion for
leave to amend. Also heard were the motions of GECC and IHC to
dismiss.

Plaintiffs ASCU and ASC (ASCU) were present through John R.
Lund, Kara L. Pettit, John Ashton and Clark Taylor, Wolf was
present through Victoria C. Fitlow, Osguthorpe was not present,
Krofcheck and others (The English Inn, Fairway Springs, White
Pine Development, Deerpath Development, Forum Development, Paul
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hereinafter Krofcheck) were present through Jason D. Boren,

IHC

Health Services (IHC) was present through David L. Mortensen and
Lauren Sherman, General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) was
present through Kenneth W. Yeates and Kyle C. Thompson, and
Smiths were present through Robert G. Wing.

ASCU filed their motion on March 2, 2009.

Wolf filed an

opposition response.and its motion for leave to-amend on March
12, 2009.

Krofcheck, third party defendants, joined in

plaintiffs' motion on March 18, 2009.

GECC on March 24, 2009,

joined ASCO's motion to strike, and filed its own motion to
strike and dismiss and alternatively for a more definite
statement. ASCU filed a reply on March 26, 2009, and an
opposition to the motion of Wolf to amend.
was filed that same day.

A request to submit

Based thereon oral argument was

scheduled.
Thereafter IHC joined in the ASCU motion and filed its own
motion to dismiss on March 27, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the court
granted Wolf's request to file a consolidated response to the
motions of the third parties to dismiss.

Evidently the parties

received that but it was not filed with the court until the "
morning of this hearing, April 24, 2009. GECC filed a reply in
support of its motion to dismiss or for more definite statement
"on" April"21," "2"0097*" "KroTch'ec'FTiTecT"a Teply~TrTsupport' '61" it"s
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motion to strike and dismiss on April 22, 2009, and a request to
submit on April 21, 2009,

Also on April 22, 2009, ASCU joined in

GECC's motion to dismiss. IHC filed a reply in support of its
motion to dismiss on April 23, 2009.

Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement.

Before the hearing the court carefully considered

the memoranda and other materials that had been submitted by the
parties. Some of the pleadings were not filed until the day of
the hearing or one or two days previous.

Since taking the

issues under advisement, the court has further considered the law
and facts relating to the issues and the latest filed pleadings.
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling
and Order.

BACKGROUND
As can be seen' from the headings of the case, this matter
involves the consolidated claims of several parties.

This case

also has considerable background and the court has set forth that
background in several previous rulings.
However, the court will attempt to provide the pertinent
background to the pending motions.
.On July 28, 2006, ASCU filed its First Amended Complaint
"a^aiTTs't:"' Wolf~ a'lTe'gl*ng"~ numel:^

""act"idn"*arising from a*
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long history of disputes between the two entities, including
claims related to Wolf's alleged actions delaying construction of
a golf course development within The Canyons SPA.
On September 21, 2006, in response to ASCU's amended
complain, Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by
this court.

On December 18, 2006, Wolf filed its answer and

counterclaims.

Wolf's counterclaims against ASCU included

various breach of contract and tort claims related to ASCU's
alleged failure to fulfill its development obligations under the
SPA Agreement, including the golf course.
On December 19, 2006, Wolf filed its own First Amended
Complaint in case no. 060500404, which was almost identical to
Wolf's counterclaims against ASCU in case no. 060500297.

In

addition to numerous other allegations, Wolf again asserted that
the ASC parties, herein ASCU, breached the Ground Lease and SPA
Agreement with respect to their obligations to build a golf
course.

Wolf also asserted that the GECC leasehold mortgages

were improper.
On August 25, 2008, the Osguthorpe parties filed a First
Amended Complaint in case no. 070500520, essentially combining a
myriad of existing claims from three different cases into one
complaint.

In addition to claiming fraud against ASCU for

asserting false authority to enter into an agreement with the
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Osguthorpes failed to receive the consideration bargained for in
their agreements with Wolf and ASCU for use of their property for
the operation of The Canyons ski resort.
On August 26, 2008, a hearing was held before this court at
which the parties, including Wolf, agreed to and were ordered to
answer the Osguthorpes' amended complaint within 30 days.

This

court also issued a ruling, as a result of the hearing, ordering
discovery to move forward and for the parties to make dates
available in October and November 2008 for depositions*
On September 24,.2008, ASCU served its answer to the
Osguthorpe complaint within the time agreed upon with this court.
On October 21, 2008, this court entered a second .amended case
management order.

The order provided that all fact discovery was

to be completed by July 1, 2009, and that the parties be allowed
no more than fifteen depositions absent leave of the court.
On October 27, 2008, due to Wolf's alleged lack of
cooperation in providing dates- in October and November for
depositions as ordered, ASCU filed a motion to compel the
deposition of Mr. Griswold.

The court withheld ruling on the

motion and ordered that a special master be appointed to assist
in moving discovery forward•
On November 24, 2008, ASCU sent a subpoena to appear and
provide testimony at deposition to Kenny Griswold.

Mr.
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Los Angeles, California.

On January 30, 2009, Wolf filed its

response to the Osguthorpe complaint.

The filing of the answer

was four months after the deadline established by the court.
Wolf's response includes cross-claims against ASCU and Enoch
Smith, as well as a third party complaint against the D.A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership and eleven other defendants, whom
have had no previous involvement in any of these consolidated
matters.

Wolf's cross-claims and third party complaint are the

subject of the motions before the court.

ARGUMENTS
ASCU'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND WOLF'S MOTION TO AMEND.
ASCU argues that Wolf's cross claims and third party
complaint was improperly attached to its answer to the Osguthorpe
complaint.

ASCU argues, that under Rule 14, URCP, a defendant may

bring claims against a non-party who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of plaintiff's claims; however, Wolf does not
assert that the third party defendants are liable to Wolf but
Wolf seeks contribution from them, which is not permitted under
the rule or Utah law.
ASCU further argues that Wolf's third party complaint was
due by December 30, 2006, under Rule 14, URCP, and since it was
not filed until January 30, 2009 the filing is untimely and
"cTaiiii"*3~r~"4]" 5," "ITn^
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that"'"'

any portion of the' cross-claim that does not relate to the
Osguthorpes'. claims against Wolf should be stricken under Rule
13(f), URCP.
AS CO argues the pleading of Wolf should be stricken because
it does nothing more than cause delay and prejudice to ASCU, as
well as the other third party defendants. There is no reason it
was filed.so late as Wolf knew at least as early as October 2007
of the claimed event that triggered the filing of these cross and
third party claims. Since then substantial discovery, over'
110,000 pages of material, have been produced, 7 depositions have
occurred and approximately 20 more are set in May and June 2009.
In addition, ASCU argues that Utah.law does not permit
claims for contribution unless such right is conferred by
contract and since that is not the case here, Wolf's third claim
for contribution fails. ASCU further argues Wolf's third party,
claims for relief should be raised in either Wolf v. Summit
County, 070500597, or in a wholly new-matter since Wolf seeks
specific performance of the SPA Agreement which relate to the
Wolf v. Summit County case.

Finally, ASCU argues that Wolf timed

the filing of its cross-claim and third party complaint to derail
discovery and therefore the third party complaint and portions of
the cross-claim should be stricken.
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Wolf argues that its golf course related third party
complaint and cross claims are timely filed and properly relate
to the subject matter of this consolidated litigation.
Specifically, Wolf argues that it viewed its response to the
Osguthorpes' amended complaint as a pleading being filed in the
entire consolidated action and therefore the claims are related.
Wolf claims the Osguthorpe complaint alleged all agreements were
declared void and that invited this response in the form of these
cross claims and third party claims.

Wolf further argues that

the deadline for amending pleadings and adding parties under the
second amended case management order had not yet passed when this
was filed, and because Wolf discovered the basis for its claims
against the thi.rd parties in December 2008, it should be allowed
to proceed with its claims.
Wolf also argues that it is not attempting to delay
discovery and is fully cooperating with discovery.
Finally,.Wolf seeks leave from the court to file its thirdparty complaint and cross-claims.

In response to Wolf's arguments ASCU once again contend that
Wolf's third party complaint and cross-claims should be stricken
because of Wolfs failure to comply with Rule 14, URCP, and
because it is attached to the' incorrect pleading.

ASCU further
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sufficient justification and would result in delay and prejudice.
More specifically, ASCU contends that Wolf has asserted vaguely
and without support that it was not until December 2008 that it
learned of unidentified facts that led it to file its third party
complaint, which is insufficient justification for its untimely
motion. ASCU also contends that they, as well as the third party
defendants, would be substantially prejudiced if Wolf is allowed
to file its complaint since factual discovery is scheduled to be
concluded by July 1, 2009.

Finally, ASCU urges that Wolf cannot

show that the other landowners would be legally liable to Wolf if
Wolf is found in breach of its Ground Lease Agreement with ASCU
and thus Wolf's claims are legally insufficient.
As noted GECC and IHC join in .this motion of. ASCU.

GECC MOTION TO DISMISS.
GECC, in addition to joining the above motion of ASCU,
moves to dismiss the claims against it. GECC argues that both
procedurally and substantively the claims against it must be
dismissed.
The only possible basis for Wolf's claim is under the Ground
Lease, section 16.01.

The court should rule as a matter of law

on that claim that there need not be a contemporaneous exchange
of equivalent value where only a security interest is granted, as
that section allows a leasehold mortgage or trust deed, with

-10-
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notice but permission is not needed, except ONLY where the
leasehold interest is transferred then there must be an
equivalent value exchange.
Because that is so, there can be no tort liability because
there has been no improper conduct as the Ground Lease allows
such as was done here.

GECC joins in the argument that there is

no cause of action for contribution and the Utah Liability Reform
Act does not create a claim for allocation of fault in contract
matters.

IHC MOTION TO DISMISS,
• IHC is in the same basic posture as the Krofcheck third
party defendants and makes the same arguments in joining the 7\SCU
motion and also moves to dismiss as does GECC.
There can be no contribution by bringing in other land
owners.

IHC is not involved in any way with the Ground Lease and

substantively there can be no valid claim.
Procedurally, this pleading is again untimely and will
create prejudice to these third party defendants.

KROFCHECK JOINDER IN MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION TO DISMISS.
Third party defendants Krofcheck argue that the third party
complaint is untimely and contrary to the rules of civil
procedure and should be stricken.

Krofcheck'further argues that

-11-
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permitting the late joinder of the third party defendants would
be patently unfair and prejudicial since discovery is scheduled
to conclude on June 30, 2009, within 60 days.

Krofcheck further

argues W o l f s "supplemental notice of joiner [sic] of additional
defendants'' does not ameliorate Wolf's failure to seek or obtain
leave to amend.

Finally, Krofcheck argues that Wolf's attempted

joinder cannot be justified as an attempt to allocate fault under
the Utah Liability Reform Act therefore, ASCU's motion should be
granted.

The motion to dismiss by Krofcheck also urges that Wolf
knew, as shown by its pleadings in October 2007 and its
depositions of a Wolf principle, Paul Peters, in that same time
frame, that these third party defendant property owners had not
transferred their land. Thus, the claim of Wolf that it learned
of such for the first time in December 2008 is simply wrong.
Thus, both procedurally and substantively the third party
complaint against Krofcheck should be dismissed. The basis of all
three claims against the third party defendants is that the
Ground Lease -was breached and the SPA Agreement governs these
issues.

Liability cannot be apportioned under contract claims,

but only, under tort claims.

In opposition to the third party motions the court on April

-12-
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13, 2009, allowed a consolidated response.

Evidently the parties

received that on or about April 17, 2009, but it was mistakenly
not filed with the court until the day of the hearing. Wolf
argues that it need not obtain leave to amend under Rule 15,
URCP, as the Osguthorpe First Amended Complaint opened the
litigation to involve all agreements between all the parties.
All issues surrounding the golf course are made a part of this
case.

ASCU has alleged in its complaint that Wolf failed to

convey the golf course land and so Wolf can respond as it has.
Even if Wolf should have so moved for leave, it has now done so
and the court should grant that leave.
Wolf again claims that it was aware the land had not been
transferred by the third party defendants but was not aware of
the situation with respect to the escrow of the property. Only in
December 2008 di'd Wolf, by chance attendance at a meeting, find
out such facts as justified this third party complaint. .
If ASCU prevails on its claims as to the golf course, Wolf
merely wants proper apportionment and these parties need to be
parties. Wolf agrees it mis-styled the third cause of action as
one for contribution and it should be for apportionment.
.There is no prejudice as the discovery surrounding such
issues is not voluminous nor hard to comprehend.

There is no

trial date and the discovery deadline is an'd must be somewhat
•flexible given the complexity of the case.

-13-
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These claims against these third party defendants are viable
claims and even though Wolf admits it was wrong to label the
third cause of action for contribution, Wolf is entitled to have
allocation of fault if .Wolf is proven to be liable to ASCU.
The Utah Liability Reform Act is broad and allows such
claims and the statutory enactment may not prohibit a viable
cause of action.

DISCUSSION
Third Party Complaint and motion to amend.
Here, while Wolf has had over two years to amend its answer
and/or cross-claims with regards to the golf course issues the
time to add parties or amend pleadings has not yet passed under
the case management order.. The case management order, however,
does not allow an amendment unless the other requirements of law
are met. The timing of these claims must be explained by Wolf,
Wolf's effort to do so does not convince the court. Clearly,
from other pleadings in other cases, Wolf knew the land had not
been transferred at least by October" 2-007. Thus, the reasons for
the delay are all against Wolf which has not satisfactorily
explained the delay.

In examining whether there is prejudice,

the court disagrees completely with Wolf.

Despite some comments

on occasion by counsel in this hearing and elsewhere that the
case at heart is simple, it has filed 28 volumes of court files

-14-
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and discovery completion is still two months away.
"simple'' means that cannot be it.

Whatever

With numerous depositions

scheduled in the next two months under the direction of a special
master, a step back in discovery is prejudicial to all parties
and to the concept of fairness to all parties.

These claims by

Wolf, whatever their merit, are procedurally flawed in this case
and the court will not allow the amendment sought by Wolf given
the delay and the lack of viable explanation for the delay and
the prejudice to all parties in allowing this late amendment.
Even though ASCU has known that the golf course has been at issue
for years, has included the conduct of Wolf relating to the golf
course in its first amended complaint, and even though Wolf in
its original answer has discussed the golf course, given the
posture of the case to allow Wolf to now raise these claims in
this case is not in the interest of justice.
Wolf is of course, as noted, free to defend against ASCU's
claims and assert defenses based on the conduct of others,
including the putative third party defendants.

However, those

need not be named as defendants as the already unwieldy case,
long in reaching resolution, would undoubtedly be delayed and
become more expensive and unmanageable by late-coming parties.

Thus, procedurally the court DENIES leave for Wolf to file
this late pleading.
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Moreover, Rule 14, URCP, provides that "[a]t anytime after
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
person not a party to the action'who is
for all
added).

or part

of the plaintiff's

claims

or may be liable
against

him."

to him
(emphasis

Therefore, in order for Wolf to be able to file its

third party complaint, the third party defendants must be liable
to Wolf for all or part of the ASC Parties' claim against Wolf.
In its third'party complaint, Wolf alleges, in its third
claim for relief, that if it is found liable for damages to ASCU
relating to the allegations that Wolf has prevented construction
of the golf course, every other person or entity that has also,
prevented construction of the golf course should contribute to
the damages assessed against Wolf.

In Wolf's fifth claim for

relief it seeks a declaratory judgment ordering third party
defendants to comply with the SPA Agreement and in its sixth
claim for relief seeks specific performance to order third party
defendants to comply with the SPA Agreement.
The original claims against Wolf, involving the failure to.
give the land necessary for the golf course to ASCU, stem from
the Ground Lease Agreement; a contract to which none of third
party defendants are a party.

While Wolf argues that UCA 78B-5-

817 to -823, the Utah Liability Reform Act, allows joinder of
parties to determine their proportionate share of fault, those
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statutes apply to torts; and this action is based on contract.
Wolf relies on the claimed broad definition of fault in
Field

v. Boyezf

952 P.2d

1028

(UT 1998).

Whatever Field

Jdzziewski

for has been somewhat altered in later cases such as
v.

Smith,

128 P.3d

2005

(UT 2005).

stood

To this court those cases

stand for the proposition that actions in alleged violation of
contract provisions are not meant to be governed by the Utah
Liability Reform Act. Those cases discuss whether the act
applies to intentional torts compared to negligent torts. The
concept of fault discussed in those cases cannot apply, in this
court's view, to claimed violations of contract provisions.

The

legal duties imposed by tort law, as exemplified'for example by
the economic loss rule, are different from the duties imposed by
contract provisions between parties. The duties owed, and
remedies available, are different in tort and contract law.
The court does not believe that Liability Reform Act
deprives any party of a cause of action.

The historical cause of

action for contribution was also in tort cases, not in contract
claims. National

Serv.

Industries

v.

Nortonr

931 P.2d

551,

554

(UT. App 1991) . Therefore, in order for the third party
defendants to be liable to Wolf, Wolf must be able to point to a
contractual obligation of the third party defendants in order for
them to owe an independent duty to Wolf. There is certainly
nothing in the Ground Lease about golf courses or the transfer of
-17-
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land.
However, Wolf fails to point to any contractual obligation
or other source which confers an independent duty upon the third
party defendant to indemnify or be co-obligated for any damages
assessed against Wolf.

Wolf is, of course, free to defend

against ASCU's claims on the basis that others interfered with
Wolf's ability to fully perform if that is shown.

Under the Utah

Liability Reform Act the court concludes that Wolf is not
entitled to join others who allegedly breached an agreement in
order to allocate fault.
While the court need not and does not base its decision on
this argument, the court agrees with third party defendants that
the SPA Agreement does require arbitration.

Thus, any claim by

Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject
to. the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement. Section
5.8.1 et.seq.

.

Consequently, because the third party defendants are not
liable to Wolf allowance of the third party complaint is improper
under Rule 14, URCP.

Thus, Wolf's third, fifth and sixth claims for relief are
stricken.

-18-
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Cross-Claims and the Claim against GECC
Rule 13(f), ORCP, provides that M[aJ pleading may state as a
cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein
relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the
original action."

While the rule does not specifically provide

for how cross-claims are to be brought in a case such as this,
with multiple consolidations, the court believes that allowing
Wolf to add cross-claims not directly related to the Osguthorpes'
amended complaint is not in the interest of justice. The court
finds and concludes that the Osguthorpe First Amended Complaint
did not "open up" the golf course claims in this case."
More importantly, under the above procedural analysis this
. is simply untimely and prejudicial to GECC and there has been no
satisfactory explanation as to the reason for the delay.
While the court does not fault Wolf for believing that it
could bring claims relating to the consolidated cases, it is
simply not the case that such claims belong in this case at this
time.

The ASCU case, relating to the Ground Lease and the golf

course, commenced in 2006 and Wolf's answer'has long been filed.
Therefore, in order for Wolf to be able to file cross-claims not
relating to the Osguthorpes' amended complaint, which was
recently amended, Wolf must comply with Rule 15, URCP.
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Under Rule 15, URCP, after 20 days of the service of a
pleading the party must seek leave of the court in order to
amend,

In looking at a motion to amend, the court must

specifically address "(1) the timeliness of the motion;' (2) the
justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the
responding party/'

The Berkshires,

L.L.C.

v\ Sykes,

2005 UT App

536, P15.

Once again, the claims relating to GECC have been known by
Wolf since 2006.

Wolf has not sought leave to amend or bring in

GECC during those years. Now after discovery has begun Wolf
seeks to join GECC.

While the time to add parties or amend

pleadings has not passed under the case management order, the
court finds that there would be considerable prejudice to GECC to
join them at this late juncture. Approximately seven depositions
have taken place as well as other discovery over the past two
years.

Furthermore, Wolf's contentions that it just learned of

new facts in late-December 2008, seems to be aimed towards the
golf course issues and not the fact that GECC allegedly
encumbered land with its mortgages. As noted, factually that
proposition asserted by Wolf is found to be incorrect in any
event.
Considering the motions the court has already heard in
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regards to the mortgages, the court finds it unpersuasive that
Wolf could not have joined GECC at an earlier point in time.

Therefore, because of the untimely filing and because of the
substantial prejudice that would result to GECC, Wolf's fourth
claim for relief is stricken.

In addition, while the court has issued other opinions in
the past, the court believes it now more fully understands the
Ground Lease and its meaning.

The court believes, though it is

not finally ruling, that Section 16.01 of the Ground Lease does
in fact allow such-leasehold mortgages and trust deeds as a ,
security interest, without permission from Wolf.

ONLY, and

SOLELY if there is a transfer of such a leasehold interest, does
there need to be a contemporaneous exchange of equivalent value.
Thus, if the court were not striking the pleading of Wolf, and if
the court were forced to reach the merits of the motion of GECC
to dismiss, the court would likely rule that the GECC conduct is
•not and could not be the basis of liability under Section 16.01
as it now appears to the court that this was NOT a transfer of
ASCU's leasehold interest but the creation of a security interest
in GECC.
Again, the court is NOT finally ruling on that question but
is'

advising the parties of its"current belief as to the nature

l^'!y;l![^'':if?Eil??^
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and meaning of that Ground Lease provision.

For the reasons set forth above, the ASCU's motion to strike
is GRANTED.
Wolf's motion to amend is DENIED.
< GECC's motion to strike is GRANTED.
The motions of the third party defendants, Krofcheck and IHC
is GRANTED.

The court does not reach the merits of the motions of GECC
or IHC or Krofcheck to dismiss because it has ruled the pleading
by Wolf is to be stricken.

This Ruling and Order is.the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

DATED t h i s

n

day of f y l

f)

j , 2009,
BY THE

/BRUCE K:. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-22-
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AMENDED AND RESTATED VEVELOFMENT AGREEMENT
FOR THE CANYONS SPECIALLY PLANNED AREA
SNYDERVELLE BASIN, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH

WIS AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (the
"Amended Agreement") is entered into as of this ffi" day of .KfavtoftW > 1999, by and
among ASC Utah, inc,< d.h.a, The Canyons, American Skiing Company Resort Properties,
inc. (collectively the "Master Developer".)* the group of landowners thai are listed as
Participating Owners and are signatories hereto (collectively the "Participating
Landowners"), and Summit County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, by and
through ib Board of County Commissioners ("the County'*').
' • " • • ' •

RECITALS .

A.
Master Developer and Panicipaiing; Landowners (collectively the
"Developers") are the owners, legal representatives; of the owners, or lessees, under long*
term leases of approximately 7768 acres of land and appurtenant real property rights located
in Summit County, Utah, the legal description and ownership maps of which are provided ID
Ordinance 333-A (the •"Property").
B
On July 6. 1998, the County adopted and approved Ordinance 333, which
established an initial Specially Planned Area f^SFA*') Zone District for a portion of the
-property. The initial SPA Plan for The Canyons SPA Zone District was Implemented by
Ordinance 334, a Development Agreement, among the County and various of die Developers
(the "Original Development Agreement*). .
.
C
The Original Development Agreement contemplated the need to amend the
SPA Zone District and SPA Plan in the future to provide for its expansion and to create a
master planned reson community as depicted in The Canyons SPA Plan Book of Exhibits
attached hereto and incorporated herein,
D.
The County and the Developers desire to amend and restate (tie Original
Development Agreement to provide for the vesting of certain additional land use
designation*;, densities, development configurations, yrul development standards included in
The Canyon,'} SPA Master Development Plan, as reflected on Exhibit B hereto.
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Original Deyeloptnciu Agreement, the -Count)' has encouraged the Master Developer to
employ Iruipvaiive land planning concepts within The Canyon* SPA Plan an order to cluster
and appropriately I0c9.ce development density, preserve sensitive bunds, create significant
private and public recreational amenities, open spaces, and trails, and provide principally a
nux of destination accommodations, commercial uses, and other resort, support housing,
futilities* amenities, and programs that will be carried out Within Tlie Canyons SPA Plan and
within Summit Count)1 in furtherance of the goals of tlie General Plan.
13.
A Statement of Global Principles, which Is attached liereto as Exhibit A, 1,
was applied to The Canyons SPA Plan 10 guide planning and development. The Global
Principles established certain requirements and standards in -addition 10 the standards
delineated in tlie Code and die General Plan, Tlie Global Principle* are implemented through
the regulation and monitoring of subsequent Development Approvals.(as defined below)
pursuant. .10 the terms of this Amended Agreement, and as incorporated herein shall apply,
according to their terms, to all Development Approvals within The Canyons SPA Flan. The
Global Principles and bow each is satisfied by this Amended Agreement are m forth below,
A,
Comfortable Carrying Capacity in the Ski Area. The on-mountain comfortable
carrying capacity shall exceed the bedbase at any given time,
II
Allowable Density in The Canyons SPA. The total.density within The Canyons
SPA t a t e into account comfortable carrying capacity; design guidelines that comply
with the 'policies of the General Plan and the Code; the Global Principles; die
mitigation of on- and off-site impacts; and a substantial level of economic and tax base
benefits that will accrue to die County.
G>
Required Unit Configurations and Occupancy for all Development in The
.•Canyons Resort Community ID Maximize Resort,'Guest Accommodation and Minimize
'private "Residences, This principle h met through the limitation requiring that no less
than 80% of all beds in the Resort Center are alkcaicd to resort and guest
accommodations, and within ,the Reson Core, no less ton 90% of the beds are .
allocated to resort and guest: .accommodations. .
D,
Development Phasing, This Amended Agn^meai balances the development of
resort accommodations with the comfortable carrying capacity of the Resort by
rewiring that development generally begin in (he Report Core and move outward,
•E,
Provisional Open Space. In the original SPA Ordinance, as a condition of
receiving the Phase I approvals, all remaining lands owned or controlled by several x>F
the Developers were classified as Provisional Open Space and restricted from
development until die balance of the -property received master plan approval. This
Amended Agreement establishes classes of open space which serve to ensure me
adequate protection and long term viability of open .space 'Within The Canyons SPA
Zone District.
O D 5 S 3 5> 1 1
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. F,
Development Pattern, Tilts Amended Agreement dusters development and
nt&Kimize? open space,
.
G.
Resort Support and Mountain Recreation Development, This Amended
Agreement defines guidelines for on-mountain development, which includes some on. mountain guest accommodation white limiting such accommodations to a unique rustic
mountain character designed in harmony with the natural landscape,
II
Provision of On-Mountain Ameimieb. Uniquely designed resort amenities and
accommodations will be allowed at mid-moimimn,
i,
Viewshed. This Amended Agreement establishes pmccdures for the protection
of yiwsbcds.
J
Viewshed Criteria, This Amended Agreement implements ^risual quality
objectives consistent with the Genera) PJan through defined viewshed protection
requirements as part of the design criteria in the Viewshed and Visual Quality Analysis
and Plan attached hereto as Exhibit II. 1.
K.
Environmental Enhancement, Conservation, and Preservation.. This Amended
Agreemeni enhances die environment, conservauptt, and preservation through a Natural
Resource Management Flan and a Watershed Master Plan for the Willow .Draw Area,
and through the incorporation of "green* design principles including energy efficiency
and building techniques. The Amended Agreement further complies with this Global
Principle through the implementation of the recommendation*; in die Natural Resources ..
Maniigemem Plan and the.Watershed Management Plan.
L
Employee Housing, Employee housing will be provided lor a substantia]'
number of resort employees in the Resort Center consistent with The Canyons
Employee Housing Heeds Assessment and Proposed Mitigation Plan. The balance* of
identified employee housing needs will be provided elsewhere in die SnydervIHe
Basin/Park City area, • •
H,
Economic Base, This Amended Agreement will result m substantia! positive tax
bene tits to the County and others.
.' N,
Transportation. This Amended Agreement provides for the implementation of a
comprehensive transportation plan, which includes the following components: fi)
cooperation in die creation of a regional transportation system; (ij) linkages to the Salt
Lake City area, including the airport, via various; forms of transit for employees and
guests; (hi) an internal transportation system within The Rcsan and Resort Community
including valet service, shuttle buses, and a people mover; (iv) a comprehensive
pedestrian trail system; and (vj incentives to encourage the implementation of litis
policy.
0 0 5 5 3 9 1 1 WI1297 p0£tO*O9
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0
Highway 224 and Resort Entry, A significant open space buffer will be created
along Highway 224 to establish a "green" setting, including portions of a golf course
and ike Millennium Trail and a special study for Highway 224 landscape
eitaieements,
P.
Benchmark Assessments of Resort Development, Impacts, and .Programs, This
Amended Agreement provides detailed mechanisms for linking phased growth with
mitigation measures, and for evaluating these .'beiiclxmarks, ensuring thatpolicies of
concurrency are met
Q.
Development Design Criteria, This Amended Agreement provides architectural
guidelines to assure unique architectural character and the highest standards of design
quality and construction. The guidelines Will be enforced in pari by The Canyons
Resort Village Management Association (the "RVMA"') and The Colony Master
Association..
R.
Master Community and Resort 'Facility, Amenity, Recreation, Cultural Arts,
and Marketing Program. This Amended Agreement provides for a recreation master
plan to be developed, resort amenities to be provided, a public art implementation and
management program to be instituted, and continuing cooperation with the County, the
Special Recreation District and the Park City/Summit County Arts Council. A resortwide .marketing program will be administered and paid for through The Canyons
Resort; Village Management Association,
•S.
Community integration, This Amended Agreement provides for the
establishment of s "good neighbor™ policy to provide accessibility to the .resort
.amenities by the commtmiry. A community integration plan is being developed which
. establishes appropriate buffers between lite Reson Community and existing residential
. neMiborhoods :bui also defines .linlages through appropriate trail connections and other
• . means.
:

T,
Infrastructure Maintenance and Management Tbts Amended Agreement
provides for lite maintenance of two master associations, one for The Colony and one
for the balance of The Canyons SPA.. Each .toaster association will provide for the
maintenance and management of all infrastructure owned-and controlled by that master
association. All areas of mutual interest shall be maintained and managed through a
Joint Operating Agreement between the Master Associations,
V,
Construction Mitigation and Management. This Amended Agreement provides
for mitigation and management measures to be in effect for each phase of development
to assure compliance with the Code, in accordance with .Exhibit F hereto.
14.
The Global Principles, in addition to other requirements* contain a set of
conceptual "Benchmarks", intended to provide quantitative and .qualitative measurement of
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Exhibit 11.3, shall be initialed by die RVMA within ISO days'add shall be completed
by the KVMA within 24 months of the Effective pale of Um Amended Agreement in
conjunction with, the golf course, This requirement sba.ll' include enhancement and
.maintenance on both the east and west sides of Highway 224 in a meaningful way
which promotes a quality entry to ihe Resort. "Xliis schedule will require thai golf
holes H, 12, and 13 be programmed for early construction so as lo allow for final
landscape in this period. A final plan for the entry corridor shall be .submitted to the
County within 30 days of completing the preliminary dcsi.cn and engineering for the
related portions of the golf course. Said plan shall comply with the standards set forth
in the SR 224 Corridor Plan completed by Design Workshop for Summit County and
.shal I require Low Impact Permit approval
•3.2,6 Golf Course;, The Canyons Master Plan includes an environmentally sensitive
IB-hole golf course, as depicted in Exhibit HA so as to satisfy the County's
requirement thar The Canyons be a world class, all Reason resort. The parties to this
Amended Agreement whose property includes land for the proposed golf course
acknowledge and agree that completion of the course is one of the highest priority
public amenities in the SPA. To (his end, all affected property owners hereby agree
to establish an agreement within 90 days of the Effective Date of this Amended
Agreement for die purpose of setting such lands aside ai no cost to the. County,
RVMA, or other entity for the construction of the golf course. Tlie Developers shall
permit tlie golf course developer to construct the amenity without obstruction or
•interference. Prior to start of construction of the golf course, the affected property
required for completing the golf course, including adequate buffer areas, shall be
conveyed at no cost to the. RVMA, Further, die RVMA and the Master Developer
•will ensure that the course is completed within 36 months of the effective date of this;
Amended Agreement, starting as early as possible in die Spring of 20(10. In the event
that tlie Master Developer does in fact exercise and commit the funds lo ensure
delivery of tlie golf course as indicated herein, ten tlie Master Developer shall have
tlie option of tailing ownership of ilie golf course in its entirety. The golf course
$e<tten shall, to the extant feasible based on the.planned tearleci. maximize the
preservation of natural features especially in viewshed areas., This will be
accomplished through the. use of a "target course design" In iht most environmentally
sensitive areas. Outside of such areas design flexibility shall be permitted, in
addition, the stream corridor in Willow Draw will be reclaimed by desiguiug a more
natural stream channel that removes tlie stream from culvert* und creates appropriate
water features, und pedestrian trails and benches along tlie stream through creative
grading arid as pan of the plan. While priority may be given to residents and guests
of properties within die boundaries of the RVMA and to a Developer participating in
financing the course when approved by separate agreement with the RVMA, tee
tunes, subject to ail standard rules, regulations, and feci; established for KVMA
properties, shall be made available to the general public The golf course shall
require a Low Impact Permit approval.
O Q 5 5 3 9 1 1 fodtt?P7 *>oOtK33
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program, Together they are the basic levei of facilities that shall be
•planned to be built over ihe period required lo complete construction of
the resort* the exhibits include a schedule for completion of the facilities,
The RVMA and The Resort Developer may provide additional amenities
•as they determine appropriate. The responsibility 2nd authority for this
work is vested in the RVMA, The Resort, and. to ihe extent agreed
upon in the Resort Village Management Association Agreement, other
Project Site developers. Hie amenities and suited priorities of
construction will be diligently pursued by the RVMA, The Resort, and
relevant Project Site Developers. Tlie first priority of the RVMA is the
design and construction, of tlie golf course. With regard to its
. obligations, the RVMA shall establish and maintain a five year capital
improvement program and an annual capital budget for the purpose of
scheduling, budgeting for/ financing,, and undertaking these amenities.
The RVMA Amenity Plan, which will be reviewed with the Count)'
during the annual review, may vary somewhat based on ihe availability
of revenues to and the ability to finance the amenities by the RVMA.
With respect to tlie Resort's amenity plan, ASC Utah may amend the
implementation schedule for its amenities plan annually to account for
plan changes and adjustments. To alter tlie improvements included in
ASC Utah's amenity plan, County approval shall be required. In. cases
•where alternative funding, sources may be available, the potential for use
of those sources will be fully explored' th .order to achieve the priorities
indicated,
(2)
Exhibit 1.2 identifies the trail system for The Resort and the
. Resort Community. Easements -or othej conveyance for major regional
trail segments will be given to the Snydervilb Basin Special Recreation
District. Conveyances, easements and construe*ion standards and
responsibilities shall be as described in Exhibit 1,2,3.
<3)
"Hie RVMA shall prepare a Rcsart Competitiveness .Analysis at
least even* five years to assess the position of The Resort arid Resort
Community versus other global businesses viewed as competitors. Such
analysis will be undertaken with two markets in mind ~ short-term
visitors to The Resort and resort property purchasers. The purpose of
the analysis is to identify trends in die industry and anticipate and
implement, when appropriatet programs, amenities and facilities,
marketing strategies, real estate offerings, and olhur measures to
capitalize on such trends and attraei and retain customers. The RVMA
will include the analysis in die Annual Review in these years that the
analysis is undertaken,
{4)

The Master Developer, the RVMA. and Director shall continue
38
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5.5.1 Any default, or inability to care a default caused by strikes; lockouts, labor
disputes, acts of God,, inability 10 obtain labor or materials' or reasonable- substitutes
therefor, enemy or hostile governmental action, civil coiunioii.au* fire or other
casualty, and other similar causes beyond die reasonable control of the parry obligated
to perform, shall excuse the performance by such party far u period equal to the. period
during which any such event prevented, delayed or stopped my required performance
or effort to cure a default,
5.5.2 In die event the real estate sales figures published by the Park City Board of
Realtors show -a 20% or greater decline for real estate sales in the Park City area for
the comparable six-month period in the preceding year or If the number of beds rented
published by the Park City Chamber of Conimefce/Conventum and Visitors Bureau for
die Park City area shows a 1.0% or greater decline hi lite number of beds rented for the
comparable six-month period of the preceding year, then the R.VMA and /or The
Colony Master Association may notify the Community DevelopmeM Director of such
downturn m the economy and request u six-month extension of all the time limits set
forth herein, Upon die verification of .such published figures, bin in no event later than
twenty (20) days after such request:, the Director shall grant a six-month extension on
all relevant dates of performance as .set forth herein. The Director shall thereafter
immediately provide notice of such extension to die Planning Commission and BCC.
IJI die event such downturn continues, the Director may grain additional she month
extensions for the duration of the downturn. The RVMA may request and receive .up
to a maximum of twenty-four (24) months of such extensions during the first fifteen
.(15) years of the term of this Amended Agreement,
Section 5,6 Con*inu i rig Obligations. Adoption of law or other governmental activity making
.performance by the Developers unprofitable, more difficult or more expensive does not
excuse the performance of the obligations by the Developers,
Section 5,7 Other Remedies. All other remedies at law or hi equity« which are consistent
wilii die provisions of this Amended Agreement are .available to the patties to pursue in the
event there is a breach.
Section 5*8 Dispute Resolution.
5.KJ Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein
shall not sufficiently resolve, a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator
agreed upon by the parties* or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator
or arbitrators shall be selected in. accordance with the rules of lite .American Arbitration
Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be. resolved by die
binding decision of the arbitrator, and judgment upon die award rendered by the
.arbitrator may be entered in. any court having jurisdiction-thereof. .However, in no
instance shall rids arbitration provision prohibit the Count)' from exercising
60
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enforcement of its police powers where Developers are in direct violation of die Code.
5 JL2 Institution of Legal Action. Enforcement of any such arbitration decision shall
be Irxsiitutcd in the Third Judicial District Cairn nf the County of Summit, State of
Utah, or in the United States District Court, for Utah.
5.S3 Rights of Third Parties. This Amended Agreement is not intended to affect or
create any additional rights or obligations .on the part of third panics.
5.8.4 Third Party .Legal Challenges. In those instances where, in oris Amended
Agreement, Developers have agreed to waive a position with respect to die
applicability of current Count}' policies and requirements, or where Developers have
agreed to comply with current Count)' policies and requirements, Developers further
agree not to participate either directly or indirectly in any legal challenges to such
County policies and requirements by third panics, including but no? limited to
appearing as a witness, amicus, making a Financial contribution thereto, or otherwise
assisting in the prosecution of the action.
5.8.5 Enforced Delay. Extension of Times of Performance, hi addition to specific
provisions of diis Amended Agreement, performance by die County, lite Master
Developer, or a Participating Landowner hereunder shall not be deemed to be in
default where delays or .defaults are due to war, insurrection, strikes, walkouts, riots,
floods, earthquakes, ores, casualties, or acts of God. An extension of time for such
cause shall be granted in writing by County for the period of the enforced delay or
longer, as may be mutually agreed upon.
5,8*6 Attorney's Fees. Should any party hereto employ an attorney for the purpose
of enforcing this Amended Agreement, or any judgment based on this Amended
Agreement, or for any reasons or in tmy legal proceeding whatsoever, including
insolvency, bankruptcy, arbitration, declaratory relief or other litigation, including
appeals or re-hearings, and whether or noi an action has actually commenced, the.
prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party thereto rcimbuTsems.ni
for ail attorney's fees and all costs and expenses, Should any judgment or final order
be issued in that proceeding, said reimbursement shall he specified therein.
$<&,7 Venue. Venue for all legal proceedings related to this Amended Agreement
shall be in the District Court for die County of Summit, in Coalville, Utah.
5.8*8 Damages upon Termination. Except with respect to jusi compensation and
attorneys' fees under mis Amended Agreement. Developers shall noi be entitled to any
damages against the County upon the unlawful termination of this Amended
Agreement.
Section 5.9 Term of Agreement and Automatic Renewal.
' '

*,
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Ik exercise of its governmental functions. The Project is not a joint venture, and there, is no
such relationship involving ihc County Nothing in this Amended Agreement shall preclude .
rite Master Developer and any Panicipatirig Landowner from forming any form of investment
entity for the purpose of compleuriE any ponton of the Project,
Section 6.2 Construction of Agreement. This- .Amended Agreement shall be construed so as .
10 effectuate the public purpose of resolving disputes, implemenuag Jung-range planning
objectives, obtaining public benefits; and protecting any compelling, countervailing public
interest; while providing reasonable assurances of continued vested development rights under
litis Amended Agreement.
Section 6,3 Covenant "Running with Land. This Amended Agreement shall be recorded
against all legal parcels of record within the Property described in Summit Conwy Ordinance
333-A* All the terms and conditions contained herein shall be deemed to "run with the
land" and shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of all successors in ownership of
parcels within (he Properly, As used herein, .Developers' shall include die parties signing ibis
Amended Agreement and identified as "Developers," and all successor owners of any parcel
of laud within the Property.
Section 6.4 .Notices. All notices hereunder shall be given in writing by certified mail,
postage prepaidk at the following addresses:
To the County:
The Board of County Commissioners of Summit County
Sunim.it County Courthouse
'P.O.Box 128
•Coalvilte, Utah g40I7
Summit County Director of Community Development
P.O. Box 128*
Coalville, Utah 84017
With copies to:
David L. Thomas'
.Deputy Summit County Attorney
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017

8*01297 Po00469

To the Master Developer;
Greg Spearn
Senior Vice President

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Canyons
4000 The. Canyons Resort Drive
•pArir City. Utah 84098
Juiiannc C\ Ray
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel
American Siding Company Resort Properties* Inc.
One Monument Way
•Portland, Maine 04101
With copies to:
Clark Thompson, Esq.
Bracewell and Patterson
711 Louisiana, Suite 2900
Houston, I X 77GQ2-27S1.

To the Participating landowners:
At the addresses set forth in Ordinance 333-A.
Or i,o such other addresses or to the attention of such other person as either party or their
successors may designate by written notice.
Section 6,5 Recordation of Agreement. The Count)' Clerk of Summit County shall, within
ten (10) days after the Effective Date of the ordinance adopting this Amended Agreement,
record this Amended .Agreement.
.Section 6.6 Severability, 'If any provision of this .Amended Agreement* or the application
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, mid, or unenforceable, but
(he remainder of litis Amended Agreement can be enforced without failure of material
consideration IO any party, then the remainder of tins Amended Agreement shall not be
affected thereby and it shall remain in full force and effect, unless amended or modified by
•mutual consent of the parties. If any material provision of this Amended Agreement is held
invalid, void, or unenforceable or if consideration is removed or destroyed, the Master
Developer or the County shall have the right in their sole and absolute discretion to terminate
this Amended Agreement by providing written notice of such termination to the other part}'.
Section 6.7 Indemnification and Hold Harmless.
6.7 J. Agreement of Developers. Developers agree to indemnify and hold harmless
the County, its officers,, agents, employees, consul hints, attorneys, special counsel ainf
representatives from liability:
O O S 5 3 9 1 1

BK01297 PGD0470

.66

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not contained herein.
Suction (115 Execution of Agreement. This Amended Agreement may be executed in
iimkiple. parts or originals or by facsimile, copies of executed originate; provided, however, if
executed and evidence of execution is made by facsimile copy, then an original shall be
provided 10 die oiher pany within seven (7j days of receipt of said facsimile copy.
Section 6 16 Relationship of Parties. The contractual relationship between the County and
trie Master Developer and Participating Landowners arising out of this Amended Agreement
us one of independent contractor and not agency, This Amended Agreement does not create
any third party beneficiary rights. It is specifically understood by the par ties that: (a) The
Canyons SPA Plan is a private development; (b) County has no interest In, responsibilities
for. or duty to third parties concerning any public improvements to the Property unless the
County accepts the public improvements pursuant to the provisions of ibis Amended
Agreement or in connection with subdivision or condominium plat or site plan approval; and
(c) Developers shall have the full power and exclusive control of the Property subject to the
obligations of the Developers set forth in this Amended Agreement.
Section 6.17 Applicable Law. This Amended Agreement is entered into under and pursuant
to, and is to be construed and enforceable in accordance with, the laws of die State oflJiah.
Section 6.18 I./ical Laws and Standards. Where this Amended Agreement refers to "local
laws and standards" it means the laws and standards of general applicability to The Canyons
SI*A Plan and all other developed and subdivided properties wiihin the Snydervflle Basin of
Summit County.
Section 6,19 State and Federal Law, The parties agree, intend and understand that Ore
obligations imposed by this Amended Agreement are only such as are consistent with slate
and federal law, The parties further agree that if any provision of this Amended Agreement
becomes, in its performance:, inconsistent tvith state or federal law or ts declared invalid, this
Amended' Agreement shall be deemed amended to the extent necessary to make it consistent
with state or federal law, as the case ma}' be, and die balance of this Amended Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 6.20 Exhibits Incorporated. All Exhibits in die Book of Exhibits arc incorporated by
reference herein as if full}' set forth herein.
Section 6.21 School and Institutional Trust Lands. Notwithstanding any other provision of
tliis Agreement to the contrary, ail obligations imposed under this Agreement as they may
relate to die State of Utah acting by and through the School and institutional Trust Lands
Administration or its successor agencies, shall be satisfied by the Master Developer, and all
parties to this Agreement agree to look solely to the Master Develops! in any action to
enforce this Agreement with respect to lands owned by the State of Utah. Nothing in this
Agreement or the exhibits thereto shall be deemed to waive the sovereign immunity of the
69.
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Stale, of Utah except through compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; to
permit the Imposition o; enforcement of any lien or assessment as against state lands; or to
waive the provisions of Utah Cods Ann. § 17-27*104.5 or any successor statute; provided,
however, that the State of Utah, by execution of this Agreement,, agrees to grant conservation
elements direct)}' in the manner required by paragraph 1&2.2.1 of this Agreement for the
benefit of the County, and to adhere to the density allocation foi State, property provided by
this Agreement and the Canyons SPA Plan.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this .Amended Agreement has been executed by Summit
County, acting by md through the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, State
of Utah, pursuant to Ordinance Bffi-K , authorizing such execution, and by a duly authorized

representative of Developers, as of the above stated date.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
OUNTY, STATE OF UTAJ*

Sheldon D, Richins, Chairman

STATE OP UTAH
; ss.

COUNTV OF SUMMIT
The foregoing instrument as acknowledged before me this I<T clay of 7 l * ^ . * * J u i i * ,
1999. by Sheldon D. Richins, Chairman of \ht Board of Count}7 Commissioners of Summit
County, State of Utah.

. . I l Q k ^ ^ ,\. fe/SJ^Lfei
s&*=±l

Notary Public

'^'ISPv
Notary Public
j
"" N % HAfiSKA S. CIIITTeWDEN t
j \ eoftafff>w*.iS!. P.0 Boast i

My commission expires:
1— « ^ £ J C « mm mtm^mJmmmtJmm
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ASC l^AH, INC, d.lvi. WECANYONS

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

,rfe

.. 1999. bv

Tlw forgsuwnc. teirumeni was adznojvlcdspd before meJlsis j j L

£*p?^^

.-^3-

is&ion. expires: AJov,
Ivlv conunis^ion.

SPfcWCEH G SANDSES
Malory PMoflc

k I K * ^ * ^ ° « gv w gjwft

/*-/ &*f&°\

AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY RESORT
PROPERTIES, IMC

...By: &3£.tiS&v£

&-

&*-r*.f**ff&f T*

ST ATE OF UTAH
:s%.
COUNTY .OFSUMMIT
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged bid w w t U i s i S ^

^ffefiiry Public

.

My commission expires:

.

/ O

4

1999. by

SPQiCER G SAKD33
Notary Pubte
,

I
I

Swop*; C* Part: Cllv tn 5<o?a F

OD5539 X1
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BeavcrCrcck Associates

1
STATE OP

0aAJikjA nrr SctrcAw^,

L45
Q*.

COUNTY OF ^ M M I f

: ss.

j

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before rnc liws

/

day of

/ *

f

TO

Notary Ptfbljc
~-«» »•».« —

"•'' ^ ^ " ^ » « ( . ^ p i . m r M R ' sag/aastf m <

Residing at; CTk^U^iT-

C^ifSTf

MY Commission
Commission Expires;
MY
hxpir

Thaii Schncilcr

Its*

STATE OF.

COUNTV OF
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before vac ihi$ ,r. „..„ day of ^
i 999, by
.
' • ' - . "

Notary Public
Residing ai:^,.
My Commission Expires:
O D 5 S 3 9 11
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Wolf Mountain Resarts, LC
By
Its:
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D A Osgutliorpc Family Pannerafaip

. 7

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

<?

,

w&
i^TT^
ftra/UAM

The fbreeoms instrument was acknowledged before me thus

—- ^

<r

7J_ dav of PjVg^gg?f—-"

- /

/

/

^

) /

•*"—t—5*r~
,fta&cK*5>

i

CJ

Notary P^b)/jc
Residing at: irUj^^J.

f

C^**^

My Coinitiissitin Expires:

Diivtff B Johnsion Family Faitnersfup
By:
Its:
STATE OF.
COUNTY OF
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
1999. bv
.

day of_

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Cdrmnlsuion Expires:
DOS

£ 3 3 9 i i
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Wi I'll am Lincoln Spear
LcsiccShcrrili Spoor

lis:

STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
1999, by"
.

day of.

Notary Public
Residing at:,
My Commission Expires:

]mn iVioumam Associates, LLC
. By: _ _
l\s>
STATE Of

)
' 5S.

COUNTY OF

„

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
1999, by"

day of

Notary Public
Residing at..
My Commission Expires:
O O S 5 3 9 11
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13-iC Hospitals, Inc.
By:

_

Its:
STATE OF.
COUNTY OF
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged btiorz mc this
1999. by
„__

tfay

of _

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:.

Qlympus Construction LLC
OsSiz - ©5puiai»c Parcel}
By-

STATE OF

U.TA3f

<r ftApi \ T ~ )
CDQNTY OF r7^1
The fbregoma instrument was acknowledged befbie me this

1999, by S^CrjTxJ^^U

£>

day of /J& eKQjS^

.

4Pffi&IEAPEBEZ

,

r.&,fttt*9B0

f

^^
I—7^
Kotfury
Public
Horary FuWic

Y

(

y
/

Residing at:..
My Commission Expires;
O*
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The Canyons Cabin Club, LLC
(Baker Parcel)

• OF

VcFku

COUNTY OF J ^ M N - U T ^

\

L^
The foregoing instromcai was acknowledged before me dug ^

_

_

/ * /r'l?

^ A
p.o.BWKBwo

*

day of .NcTVfivqgg^

Notary^PuDln;

^

«' I (Wy

LS^-.-.^,^^^S--J

Residing at: CH^MfrMj

iVH' Commission Expires:

Hsrot'd E. Habc&ek
By;
It*:
STATH Or
;0U>^1T OF.
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me chis^.
1999, by

;

.

Notary Public
Residing at:
M\ C »Tiirii^ii""»r. F\pi-=^
005539 1 1
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&

G00*£1

M*
&

*^J*J

MC

SSM^^^^^V
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.Halbel Engineering, Inc.
By:

ST A t'E Of.,
;. ss..
COUNTY OF
The foregoing instnimeni was acknowledged before m.e this
1999. bv~ .. . _
, ~

dzy of^

Notary Public
. Rcsiditie at:
My Commission Expires:

Harold R. & Kjith B, Weight

^ ^ — -

nv *#A/ X/r ^ ) / /
f / ^
•

STATE OF,

«j4f-

-"

f "' *' £ *

if

;

7'

*

' i"

\

Irfkd

COUNTY OF S f A M - P U f

i

The foftgaasg iastnimeaip'as adjaowtetiged before me_thts

, , rf>iftA'UUhttQ&£390 ft

•* J S S & I ® ~ J /, ^

Mv; Commission

rp

(?

N'otanC' Bubhc

day of N f f J ^ W P ' '

/:>

'

Residing at: QLiUt^iT"

f—,,

jk)\f^n

_ _

00553911
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APPROVED AS TO FOR&I:
JAN GRAHAM
ATTjpftKgY OeNcftUL^

State ofUiah School &• Institutional Trust:
Lands

By: l
1(5

I L

P^^sT <P/g

SI"ATE OF. „, LkitxA :..,
COUNTY OF^L/t.^AA^

i

The foregoing insfcruaientjvas acknowledge bstore me ibis ll-&~ day of V/tncPt/^t

/ :

,v.^x

DAWNYEILGALJJEN

/v«^su^^ Mm paw, $urt «/ inm
€78 EAST 600 SOUTH *500
*ALTlAKE5rTY.VrA>< M 1 «

a

-

T

:

0~~

~ "

Notary Public

COMM.EXRMS-02

ResidinE at: $(->£-, aJT
.My Commission Expires:

Mines Ventures:9/f0fcCompany, Inc

;

-"—~

y

UT??^

S T A I E OF.

s.

COUNTY OF C&fis^f~tj
day of ?%&\f&Mgg?<

lilt fpregpufig insiiumeai wz$ acknowledged before me this J^_
vm< bv P&g&Lr C • CVUM/A J/?? ^

~2
. ^^!^k

"GELt* PEREZ I

*
ta»-wto» 1C.OT5P

/ -w

1»

Urf-

#5

1

1

i~- ^4n *-"~L7

" T ^ j 1 f>r ^

s£4J
&&

>>*G
»
& * i

* M

H

<-*

r

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r u J ,"

Notary P u S * * * T

. ..

SAS&A KARB DATBR $
Pes: ca».l**h MOSS

,
^S^

t

lis:

STATE OF

(jTCbK-.

COUNTY OF ^ O u ^ ^

.

_

C & M Properties, LLC
-.

>^-^

/'

/Vf^/<?jt>?$^

i
>* tT

.1i

HA
The Inreyqinginstrumentwas.acknow]edged bctoreme this /.£.. day of Moi//9m ban ,

v

— "'Notary
Notary Public

_ ...

, 9...

Z-./7

M y Comm m io nj} Kpires:

Silver Kirm Mines

-

,

frlT^

STATE Or

,

" /

_

5u^rv^-r

)

: $$.-

wi**day at* JJffi• C ? ^ j ^ P '

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this t & J

.Mens, i

b^^s^*=^Ji2^r

l^v Conimission Expires;
OO5:S39 1 1
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Parkway land Development, LC
By:

^

Its:
STATE 0 ? .
COUNTY OF.
The foregoing instrument was admowledged before me this
1999, by
.

day of\.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

STATE Of.

to«€—jay*-***. r ^ / \ ^ ^ ^ v ,

HTMt
si;..

COUNTY OF

cTin YM^LAA

\

The foregoing lustrum.em was acknowledged before mr this

,
P.O. Bo? 3206
J'ateCty.Ua*! ©4080.233?

*
ft

2 ? £ C _ ^SWfiiUWap^ J .

day of Ul)]J$tf$Eff*-

J.

Notary P&4&

&

Residue at; £ T »u-*i~cf

Ck*M?

y

Mv Commission Expires:
QOJ

J?.U
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STATE OF UTAH:

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)

The Foregoing instrument: was acknowledged before me this

199% by "tibtiM^r&ll&fd

'"!

Mmwm. !
i W E ® "SgiSSKST i
-S«i«yBL»J

/

day of November,

,

3^f^%^^^ - d ^
Notary Pibk

<J~

Residing at: ^ v VIA IUM ' j -

^QtW-''H

My Commission Expires:
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t-m~W-lS9B

425 615 AB5S

Tha Canyons> RE Drue lop.

14:22

IHC Hospitals, b e ,

P,02/02

«lw»/ IHC Hec^tt^ S e r v i c e s

STATE OF J&jeJ,,*'
COUNTY oN*M3&^~

)

T

n

The foregoing instrument was Bclainwledged before me this . ^ ^ " day vH/WtfflkKr,
1999. b
SfiL-

Notary Public

Readingli^ftfc^f:.
Ixi^Cpmmission Expires:

RtchiirdJaiTii

By:
Its;

STATE OF.
: ss.

COUNTY OF,

J
day o f

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this,
i 999, by
.
_•

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
Q05.53911
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HUv— HE3- i'^SftJ

1 3 : 1V

ihe Lanuans*. St Develop.

• <?35 613 435".

P.03'"fire

JoBepb L. Krofcheck

^^4..1<a^ck
Itt:
STATE OF yif<fn^L(X^

>

COUNTY OF X^d-JritL^

\

:ss.

Theforfigoir^iittttunicQiwas acknowledged before me this ./# ^~day
1999, by c / V . Prfi/vAttlL
~

7

-Hoik

ofA^^&^C
* '

# . /&^y ^gf

^Public

V'/^

H

Residing at: A^CtM/%^%^^i^rt
My Commission Expires:

'X
."^
/ I p A. |

//j/'/J^v^'/
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GERALD KRPDMAN
By:

/_

CALIFORNIA

STATE OF UTAH
LOS ANGELES

COUNTY OF«SUMMIT

)
''

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before melius Kkh
1999, by Gerald M. Friedman
.

'^TS^L
Commission# 1225595 |
tzlh*!Sgm
^ S ^ ^ tfsiary
Public
California
^
«..wi^ - ^«III
u. 5|
IviSS?/
Ins Angela Cotfrty

day of November,

V i v . , « , .tj.iWiL

Notary Public
Residincat: Los Angeles, Calllornia

My Commission Expires:
July 19, 2003

OO553?U

BKO 1297 PsQOW

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wolf Mountain Resons. LC
Bv;

t'l'sfa

/

COUNTY QK__ lfji/rMwA

\
Jf^C

"Tltc Focceomc ir.stnimetit was acknowledged before nit this /of
1999 M
.
* >^32§>%
pi«/

Notary Puailc

"1

P*<vC«j. Uu* IM06&

r

u

dav of / w L-y s

w.

fi

Notary Public /

)

4

u$

&

Residing at- \J&<i{/}

fA&

"71
My Cottinussion Expires:

Willow Dpi*', LC

B

' lf<ri
"/^Vw
^
ST A l l : . OF.

^ i ^ 2 ^

/ ^ . . .

^

f

UJLft (
"iJS.

ca^il/ii^fwy

COUNTY

//"'"

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this J*~)

I W bv* I
_ — —

~

Notary Public
t
BARBARA LMYEfiS
»
w

I / J T & S J ^ ^\iT^Smm
WfflSSft !1

.
fi

day of ff ^ v u ,

~~"

V r
,j
^ W_/7

\

Notary-Pubt«v~.

PwKCity.Uwi»B40»

.

^f-% y

*«*«^

•

.a
//

Residing: {JlXAJA.^

7/?""

L,/s

My Comtnissio-n Expires:
Q05S39 11
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•The Hansen Group,. IX

SJKlll OF

UTA^

)

COUNTY QF " ^ M i r U A g g ^ . l

Robert M & Joaii E. Asile
By;
lis:

STATE OF.

1

COUNTY QF „

)

Theloiqjomg instrument vvas acknevw]edged before me Lim-^
(999, by" "
.

day of

Notary Public
.Residing at;

,„

__^__

My C-cunmission Expires:
•00553911
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tlalbctEngineering, Inc.

By- ^U^r&l<£.

T^U^C^C

STATE OF ^-WU
:ss.

COUNTY OF

UVflU.

The ibregqmg mstnimeaii; was admmviedgsd before me litis . J 3 _ day of /UoQEfogg?'
1999, by {JflgflLP £* BftBffidE:,?**&! t c t t r or KH U$£"T & • # / U @ & £ J « r , / ^ -

IMSaEB
4

state d u i ^

iBrt ttmnaafctK Parte Q y U t 640901

Rotary Public
Residingat: «^fi- /Jp*^, t/un /r

^ u . . *-d>

My Commission Expires:

Harold E. Babcock
B :

? ^iWaciT 7%*uu

\®

STATE OF
COUNTY QF

U4sA
U-Vsk

The foregoing instromeuii was acknowledged before me tins ./%*"** day o f r J ^ ^ ^ B l ,
%
* 999, by titt&fcP E- t ^ d s q c .
~
,-> "
SPACER G SANDSZS
Notary Pubftc
$>
f WfftGtf
State cpf Utah
I
1 x S E ^ ^ O o m r a & p h s t New \12003f
1
1&40 SurpeofcPrFQTfc Ct!y U78409ef

U6my Public
Residing at: 6 f f l ^ Lfl££

LtutSff'

My Commission Expires:
QO55 3 9 11
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NQU-12-1S39

20;IB

The Canyons. RE Develop.

-435 615 4855

F.82^Q3

DRM Invcstmept Company, L C .

Its: MtLj/AV,
,M?£&_J
t/
COUNTY OF / f i g ^ / n A K '

tt*

^MJaiii^J^-C

STATE-OF /W«?
A/

; ss

-

Trie foregoing inptmment wgs acknowledged before me this ,/V
1999, by y f r W , , ^ ^ P X *

day of

/\D)f£M1£t££L
\*3'*,.

Notary'Public
Residing a t _

" - *,;^"
*

1

«»,

My Commission Expires;

2/ldfh

^
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nijv--1&— i.^j-p^

ex? >• i ^

HIV

i.ailUWilil

INU. 4 * v w *i-'K •

STATE OF ^
COUNTY OF y / K ^ )/^K

)

ijfa—

Tii e foregoing instnxment was acknowledged before me this i i
199:

day of

*/

.

/wV^ffifejsK.

Residing at;
My Commission Expires:

3 I* */& d

OQ55S91I

ttaO'129? P*00\U

TDTfiL F.0S
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Jac-kBam'ard

STATE OF UTAH
; ss,

COUNTY OF SUMMIT
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me

1
SEAL:

4

4

ctev ol

MniL

SPBJC8? G SANDERS
Notary Pubr«c
State of Uh3h
^ ^ M>* G y r n i Espara New 12 SXB
tB*0 Sunpeofc Dr Port; Cfty OT 84TPC

ODS53? 11

BK01297 PG0IH95
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W'iiham Lincoln Spoor
Xeslee SherriU

Its:

I

STATE OF

I A,-1

)

COUNTY OF f-^JfWVtlJ

\

The foregpinE inBtrumefSfjvras acknowledsed before/fee\ h

^ ' d a y of • , / l g V

/ \
1 ^<rtt>v
/$§Rm

wtii«o* p».jii-ucCATHERINE 3AWM ;

l IV v S W ' Y A ' *0fi $»W C«jf& Uinrt 9»*t«f/

Notary Public

f;

_

I

Residing at; C l ^ m , (J I
MY Gdminission Expires:

iron Mountain Associates. LLC
tiy;

STATE OF.,
:SS.

COUNTY OF.

J
d&v of

The forgoing instrument was acknowledged before me this _
199$, bv~
-

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

D0553?Ii

Biv0i2??
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William Lincoln Spoor
Lesice ShciriU

la;

STATU OF

U7

COUNTY OF

i

^WArmJ

The foresting insrrun^i ^.acknowledged before rn«^us /••>*"' ? day o!j]£\^

1999. bv^ IMiTri^yfimyf^^

_

P " ^ ^
'"''fEln^ Public"' "
i/¥%$$\
CATHEIIINE OALYAI f
:
* / *fik *Pk' \ n ' ^ S ,ljnvc'fi{!fi; Ifer"'*' S ^ ' ' w *
$ \ 4 . TKifw /»v
My Caiw»*»ww Eat*** i

/

|
l u l l )

Moiaiy Public

^]

Residing at: ^ ^ # 4 ? ,

Wf

My gw^mj^sira. Expires:

iron Mountain Associates, LLC
By:
Its:
STATE OF.
:ss.

COiJKTY Of
dsv of

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before mc this a
1999, by"
.

Notary Public
Residing &l:

r

My Commission Expires:
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William Lincoln Spoor
Lesbi SbcrriU

By. & & ? g . ^ . b r ^
1

I

its:

STATE OF _JL
J*

JL.

• ss...

COUNTY OF ^ ^ 7 > 1 ^ ! >

iW

The foregoinc instrum^pt wss acfe^owledged befcrcfmc*\this j f ^ _ say 0I ' Jj
m
1999.by l^Sk&S><pd$&~,
/
,j
A
_

I

^•i&K

•^
.5 ill vB&SB hi

. No^aiy Public

CATWEnWEDALYAI
k ''** cuy, tram G4i)eo

Notary Public

.

l^j

Residing at: . C ^ ' T f f i . / U f
"•

My C^inmispiDAj Expires:

A)

Iron Mountain Associates, LLC

ns~
STATE OF.
:ss".

COUNTY O F .

J

The: foregoing- inscrujuent was acknowledged before me this
1999, by
.

t day

of _

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
OOS'33 9 1 1
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William Lincoln Spoor
LeslcfiherriU

lis:

ST A l t OF7 \X i
: ss.
COUNTY OF

^ ^ H / > ? ^

The f o r g o i n g instrument > s s acknowledged before metftis / c s

1999,bs:/^U^6.CffiQrL.,

/

\.

day of /Jul/

/)

n

( tikiiiMM^
* mk?m \3

Iafl3 Siia c B,Jk

* ' 6iiv6.ft^teM !

Notary rub.1 ic

1 |

My
Expires:
ay Comrrussion
LOTnrruj

•.Iron-Monnuir; Associates, LLC
TV
Its,:
STATE O F .
COUNTY O F .
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
1999, by*
.

day of.

'Notary Public
Residing at;,
My Commission Expires:
D05J5391 I

&K01297
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uric,

OT L v - u r . u . u e a n

*,,...;., * w

/o=» cv«.*w

STATE OF

rntnsrrynr iMfK
The foregoing uistrmnent was acknowledged before me this

1W,by TpffApryiLhtAn

.

TOTfiu P»S2
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i^> <—' J . *.» s_J J . V-> .*- <~J —i

OU,> W J ' J

Beaver £rcck Associ ates

r» . U£* tit

/

t^7\^

MXM

STATE OF.

COUNTYOF ^UNXM. IT"

J

Tbe foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this JjL^^f
1999, by 12flj&10 ygt-P/>U A - U u ^ i i P ^ vuJs'U "

of

/'^ffii^feft—<

Notary PgbJ;

Raiding>t- "hM^U-rr

CfrLtfTY

MY Commission
iSSionExpires:
expires;

fa: e ^ i o . n ^
STATE OF

t^

^-^fe

_jJI±L
:ss.

COUNTY OF. >hiCuli o^
Tacforegoinginsuuniciiiwasacknowledgedbeforemtthis_A
1999, by" UM?fv J /%iw"b
s-g^

WiLUAM E. CA5A0AV

day of/M( I 7^ J_,

/FWn
Notary Public

VaaX

gtU4iy[. gyp JAN. % 8K»

My Commission Empties:
•*..-. i v -U70U

Residing at: b'MU&r

Gfr^y
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WiKiafft Lincoln Spoor
LesJsc Shcrr^ Spoat

STATE OF JLiL-

Tpc {brcgoin^instrurn^nt was acknowledged before m« this _/£" day of

rtilbuqu /Lkl<k:

_
t M l l k

CAlllEBdlirMALYAI .Woiar/Kuour

IYW®8*J?J

M^l.>nrt'ic?".Hfcrt.«^.

tj/fy Compi^y^
Expires
nt^y^Expi:

/ ^

\j

<( Residing at:.. <2**J-**-tM*i

L

V

*•»—.-*--..«.••

STATE OF
COUNTY

O

F

"

^

—

>

The
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Sl:i Urid/fclC

,;

<*^/*

Its/ ^V^F- fiUzrs&wr
STATE OF * = * * '

WAU

COUNTY O F ^ ' l f r K K f '
The foregoing, instrument was acknowledged before \m this M

day of A-'OD

OiC£ y%e&bBAsr SF t^tuz^- &*>£5FBCER G SANDSS
Notary pubfic
State of Utah
y My Comrr.. brora Hav \2L 2DQ3
1040 Sunpaofc Dr Parte CHy LTT 8^096 f
"""

ll

TM"IWMiiJ'|ii'J|l!,uin^ij),Mi<|,,^l.^,t((W),

4.

x
^Xolary Public
Residing ui22£L

My Commission 'Expires:

0Q553911
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